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Preface 
This paper has been prepared by Laura Polverari and Rona Michie, at the European Policies 
Research Centre (EPRC) under the aegis of EoRPA (European Regional Policy Research 
Consortium), which is a grouping of national government authorities from countries across 
Europe. The Consortium provides sponsorship for the EPRC to undertake regular monitoring 
and comparative analysis of the regional policies of European countries and the inter-
relationships with EU Cohesion and Competition policies. EoRPA members currently 
comprise the following partners: 
Austria 
x Bundeskanzleramt (Federal Chancellery), Vienna 
 
Finland 
x Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö (Ministry of Employment and Economy), Helsinki 
 
France 
x Délégation à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'attractivité régionale (DATAR), Paris 
 
Germany 
x Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (Federal Ministry for Economics 
and Technology), Berlin 
x Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Energie des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen 
(Ministry of Economics, SMEs and Energy of the Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen) 
 
Italy 
x Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico (Ministry of Economic Development), 
Dipartimento per lo sviluppo e la coesione economica (Department for Development 
and Economic Cohesion), Rome 
 
Netherlands 
x Ministerie van Economische Zaken (Ministry of Economic Affairs), The Hague 
 
Norway 
x Kommunal-Og Regionaldepartementet (Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development), Oslo 
 
Poland 
x Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (Ministry of Regional Development), Warsaw 
 
Sweden 
x Näringsdepartementet (Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications), 
Stockholm 
 
United Kingdom 
x Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, London 
x East Midlands Development Agency (EMDA) on behalf of the English RDAs 
x The Scottish Government, Enterprise, Transport and Lifelong Learning Department, 
Glasgow 
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The research for this paper was undertaken by EPRC in consultation with EoRPA partners. It 
involved a programme of desk research and fieldwork visits among national and regional 
authorities in sponsoring countries during the first half of 2010. 
The country reviews in this report have been drafted by ERPC researchers and research 
associates as follows: 
x Dr Sara Davies (Germany) x Carlos Méndez (Spain) 
x Dr Martin Ferry (Poland) x Laura Polverari (Italy) 
x Dr Martin Ferry & Rona Michie (United 
Kingdom) 
x Victoria Chorafa, LKN (Greece) 
x Frederike Gross (France) x Heidi Vironen (Finland, Sweden) 
x Stefan Kah (Austria) x Professor Douglas Yuill (The 
Netherlands) 
x Dr Irene McMaster (Ireland)  
Thanks are also due to Mark Penman for research assistance provided, and to Dr Keith 
Clement for editing and proof-reading and to Alyson Ross for administrative and secretarial 
support. 
More detailed country information is available to partners from the EoRPA website. At 
present, country reviews focus on the EU15 plus Poland and Norway, with the remaining 
EU12 countries being combined together in a single review. The focus on the EU15, Poland 
and Norway reflects the historical coverage of EoRPA prior to enlargement and the fact that 
both Poland and Norway are members of the EoRPA Consortium. 
Many thanks are due to everyone who participated in the research. The European Policies 
Research Centre also gratefully acknowledges the financial support provided by the 
members of the EoRPA Consortium. 
 
 
 
Disclaimer 
It should be noted that the content and conclusions of this paper do not necessarily 
represent the views of individual members of the EoRPA Consortium. 
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Executive summary  
As the preparatory work for the revision of the EU budget for the period 2014+ gets 
underway, Cohesion policy is once again under scrutiny. Strategic reflections on the future 
role of the policy include its relationship with other EU policies and with domestic policies. 
A key question is whether Cohesion policy should be embedded within a wider policy 
framework with a view to achieving greater policy coherence with other relevant policies at 
both EU and national levels. The EU debate is also giving increased attention to institutional 
contexts and whether Member States have appropriate institutional frameworks and 
administrative capacity in place to facilitate the effective use of EU funding.   
Against this background, this paper explores the interrelationships between Cohesion policy 
and domestic policy frameworks and institutional environments (which the paper calls the 
external coherence of Cohesion policy), using examples from the following EoRPA 
countries  Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom  plus Ireland and Spain. A review is also presented of the main 
tensions with respect to the internal coherence of Cohesion policy, i.e. its internal 
functioning and whether some features of the current Cohesion policy regulatory 
framework may hinder the policys effectiveness in achieving its goals.  
The interrelation between Cohesion policy and domestic policies 
Studies on economic growth and regional disparities have linked the level of economic 
development of regions and the potential and speed for regional convergence to a number 
of factors, not all of which are pursued through regional policy. This suggests that it is of 
paramount importance to avoid the trap of considering regional policy  and Cohesion policy 
within it - in isolation from other policies. Such policies and spending are not always 
explicitly regionally targeted or even regionally aware, and they may have detrimental 
effects for the goals of Cohesion policy. 
Fieldwork research in the EoRPA sponsor countries has highlighted important tensions 
between Cohesion policy (and regional policy more generally where applicable), and other 
policies implemented domestically and the broader macro-economic framework. These 
relate to: (i) the overall spatial distribution of capital public expenditure; (ii) labour 
market; (iii) welfare and social protection; (iv) rural policy; and, (v) transport policy.  
Thus, from the review conducted, it is clear that Cohesion policy may be hindered from 
effective pursuit of its intended goals if there are contradictions between sectoral and 
territorial policies. The provisions of art. 175 of the EU Treaty, that EU Member States 
should coordinate their economic policies so as to attain the objectives of Cohesion policy, 
implies the need for increased cross-policy coordination, yet there is little evidence to 
suggest that considerations of external coherence are taken into account and monitored in 
the countries reviewed. Only in one country is there a tool for the ex post monitoring of the 
territorial distribution of expenditure, and the tensions that exist between Cohesion policy 
and domestic policies do not appear to have extensively and comprehensively explored or 
taken into account at the stage of policy preparation.  
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The interrelation between Cohesion policy and domestic regional policies 
Having reviewed the broader policy context for the implementation of Cohesion policy, the 
paper focuses on the relationship between domestic regional policies and Cohesion policy. 
Domestic regional policies generally include both narrow regional policy, i.e. strategies 
and interventions targeted to specific regions or territories, and broad regional policy, 
consisting of the territorial differentiation of wider policies for economic development, 
competitiveness and growth. In a few countries, notably Austria, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, narrow regional policy is not prominent.  
Narrow domestic regional policies have different goals in different Member States. 
Notwithstanding diversity in the objectives pursued, they are widely considered to be 
operating with a great deal of strategic coherence with Cohesion policy. Two types of 
strategic relationship can be identified between domestic regional policy and Cohesion 
policy: integration or coordination.  
There are a number of reasons for this high degree of strategic fit between Cohesion policy 
and domestic regional policies. First, in countries with considerable portions of territory 
covered by the Convergence Objective, Cohesion policy has played an important role in 
setting the agenda for domestic regional policy for the current period. Second, Member 
States have increasingly taken steps to ensure strategic integration between EU and 
domestic priorities and spending. Third, cross-financing arrangements between the two 
policy areas are widespread. For these to succeed, the two sets of policies must be 
strategically aligned. Fourth, for the 2007-13 period, Structural Funds programmes have 
been developed to adhere closely to the priorities and goals of the Lisbon agenda. At the 
same time, domestic policy has also been steered in this direction under the National 
Reform Programmes. Last, Member States are directly involved in setting the guidelines and 
regulations that govern Cohesion policy programmes and in setting their priorities for each 
programme period.  
Nevertheless, some tensions between the two sets of policies can be identified. These 
relate to: (i) the spatial focus of policy; (ii) the allocation of financial envelopes; and (iii) 
management and delivery arrangements (inflexibility of Cohesion policy, misalignment with 
domestic practice, additionality, contrasting timetables and disjointed implementation).  
Coordination initiatives and frameworks 
The research highlights the measures used by some Member States to coordinate different 
policies. These are both institutional and strategic and include both long-term 
arrangements and more recent measures.  
On the institutional side, the research illustrates examples of coordination of different 
policies via: long-standing institutional arrangements and recent government reforms; the 
targeting of increased cross-sectoral integration at the regional level with a reorganisation 
of functions at this level; and the achievement of increased integration between domestic 
and EU co-funded regional policy through increased operational integration at the level of 
policy instruments.  
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Among the strategic measures, the paper presents cases of: the coordination of domestic 
and EU co-funded regional policies achieved at national level through the NSRF; the 
integration of the regional dimension in sectoral policies through spatial planning; and 
coordination of regional policy with wider economic development policies at the regional 
level. However, the effectiveness of such measures warrants a more thorough assessment.  
Administrative capacities, institutional contexts and public sector efficiency 
Cohesion policy does not operate in a vacuum: it is managed, implemented and delivered 
by the public administrations of Member States and regions. The degree of institutional 
capacities available - at both these levels, at sub-regional levels and amongst partners and 
beneficiaries - is thus paramount to ensure effective and efficient policy delivery.  
All the countries covered by the paper are considered to have a degree of administrative 
capacity that is at least sufficient to ensure that policy is delivered to specification. 
Indeed, in most of the countries reviewed, administrative capacity at all levels concerned 
by Cohesion policy is considered to be high. In some cases, however, there are unresolved 
issues. In such cases, Cohesion policy funding is utilised for the purpose of raising 
administrative capacities. In other cases, the delivery of Cohesion policy has not been 
hindered by insufficient domestic administrative capacities per se, but instead by the 
introduction of domestic administrative reorganisation.  
The ‘internal’ coherence of Cohesion policy 
The last theme explored by the paper is the internal coherence of Cohesion policy, i.e. its 
internal functioning. This also presents challenges and contradictions that may 
unintentionally hinder the attainment of the goals of the policy. An extensive range of 
literature and policy research has already been produced on this topic; for this reason, the 
paper presents only a summary review of the most important of these tensions. They relate 
to the policys strategic and territorial focus and to the administration of the policy, 
perceived to be too burdensome and formalistic (and thus not in line with policymaker 
aspirations for an increased results-orientation) and also unbalanced towards financial 
accountability. Some suggestions to overcome these limitations were presented in the 
Barca Report, but there is not yet consensus on the reforms needed to strengthen internal 
coherence of Cohesion policy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As the preparatory work for the revision of the EU budget for the period 2014+ gets 
underway, Cohesion policy is once again under scrutiny. Strategic reflections on the future 
role of the policy include its relationship with other EU policies and with domestic policies. 
A key question is whether Cohesion policy should be embedded within a wider policy 
framework with a view to achieving greater policy coherence with other relevant policies at 
both EU and national levels. The EU debate is also giving increased attention to institutional 
contexts and whether Member States have appropriate institutional frameworks and 
administrative capacity in place to facilitate the effective use of EU funding.1   
Against this background, this paper explores the interrelationships between Cohesion policy 
and domestic policy frameworks and institutional environments, using examples from the 
following EoRPA countries  Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, 
Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom  plus Ireland and Spain. It seeks to identify the 
potential tensions that exist between Member States own policy and institutional contexts 
and the goals pursued through Cohesion policy.  Some of these tensions are specific to the 
relationship between EU and domestic funding; some are part of the wider relationship 
between territorial and sectoral policies; and others relate to the domestic administrative 
frameworks in which the policies are delivered.  However, all have implications for the 
likelihood of Cohesion policy to deliver on its intended objectives. The paper discusses 
these tensions and also presents examples of long-standing and more recent initiatives 
introduced to prevent them. 
It should be noted that this is a discussion paper. Rather than providing a comprehensive 
survey of all policy linkages and institutional relationships, it selectively uses examples of 
policy and institutional coherence in different EoRPA countries, as they have emerged from 
the EoRPA country research, simply to provide an illustration of complementarities and 
tensions. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses the relationship between Cohesion 
policy and wider domestic policies, considering the overall spatial distribution of capital 
public expenditure, issues of labour market regulation, welfare policy and social 
protection, before turning to rural policy and transport policies as specific sectoral policies 
                                                 
1 For a full review of the state of play of the debate on the 2014-20 budget and future Cohesion 
policy, see Mendez C, Bachtler J and Wishlade F (2010) Set t ing t he st age for t he reform of  Cohesion 
pol icy af t er 2013, Report to the European Regional Policy Research Consortium (EoRPA Paper, 
2010/6), European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow 
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with important spatial implications. Section 2 reviews the existing relationship between 
Cohesion policy and (where existing) the domestic regional policies of EoRPA countries, 
considering the degree of strategic fit between them. Section 3 illustrates examples of 
institutional and strategic means by which Member States ensure coordination between 
different policies, in particular to increase the coherence between domestic policies  both 
for regional development and more widely  and Cohesion policy. The broader topic of 
domestic institutional environments and capacities is explored in Section 4. Some of the 
tensions intrinsic to Cohesion policy, such as its conception and operationalisation, are 
reviewed in Section 5.  Conclusions are presented in Section 6, accompanied by questions 
for discussion at the forthcoming EoRPA meeting. 
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2. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COHESION POLICY AND 
DOMESTIC POLICIES  
2.1 Domestic policies and regional growth and convergence  
Studies on economic growth and regional disparities have linked the level of economic 
development of regions and the potential and speed for regional convergence to a number 
of factors, not all of which are pursued (or exclusively pursued) through regional policy. 
They include the level of education and skills in the regions,2 the available transport and 
business infrastructure,3 the availability of knowledge capital,4 the endowment of regions 
in terms of telecommunications infrastructure,5 and the existence of an efficient public 
administration and broader institutional context, e.g. a functioning judicial system.6  Some 
of these factors - the quality of human resources and infrastructure, for instance - are 
considered to generate positive externalities. If one business (or the public sector) invests, 
others also benefit, thus generating permanent positive returns to investment and 
increasing productivity and, as a result, income.7 Other factors, notably the availability of 
an efficient public administration and institutional structure, relate to the basic 
requirements without which a region is considered unsuitable as an investment location, 
due to the increased set-up and running costs for businesses (and thus production costs) or 
                                                 
2 Lucas R. E. Jr. (2000) Some macro-economics for the 21st century, Journal  of  Economic 
Perspect ives, 14, 1, pp. 159-198; De La Fuente, A. and Vives, X. (1995) Infrastructure and education 
as instruments of regional policy: evidence from Spain, Economic Pol icy, 10, 20, pp. 13-51; 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Fratesi, U. (2004) Between Development and Social Policies: The Impact of 
European Structural Funds in Objective 1 Regions, Regional  St udies, 38, 1, pp. 97-113. 
3 Aschauer D. A. (1989) Is public expenditure productive? Journal of  Monet ary Economics, 23, 2, pp. 
177-200; De La Fuente, A. and Vives, X. (1995) op. cit . ;  Helpman, E. (2004) The mystery of economic 
growth (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass); Puga D. (2002) European 
regional policies in light of recent location theories, Journal of  Economic Geography, 2, pp. 373-406; 
Moncarz, P. E. and Bleaney, M. (2010) The Regional Impact of Trade Liberalization in a Model with 
Congestion Costs à la Helpman, Regional St udies, 44, 8, pp. 935-947.  
4 Romer P. M. (1986) Increasing returns and long-run growth, Journal  of  Pol it ical  Economy, 94, 5, 
pp. 1002-1037; Romer P. M. (1990) Endogenous technological change, The Journal of  Pol it ical  
Economy, 98, 5, Part 2: The Problem of Development: A Conference of the Institute for the Study of 
Free Enterprise Systems (Oct., 1990), pp. S71-S102; Cappelen, A., Castellacci, F., Fagerberg, J. & 
Verspagen, B. (2003) The Impact of EU Regional Support on Growth and Convergence in the European 
Union, Journal of  Common Market  St udies, 41, 4, pp. 621-644; Cutrini, E. (2009) Specialization and 
Concentration from a Twofold Geographical Perspective: Evidence from Europe, Regional St udies, 
44, 3, pp. 315-336.  
5 Cieħlik, A. and Kaniewska, M. (2004) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Regional Economic 
Development: The Case of Poland, Regional St udies, 38, 6, pp. 713-725; Lamborghini, B. (2006) 
Promozione degli investimenti ICT e skil ls nei servizi per la produttività e la competitività del 
Mezzogiorno, L’ indust ria, pp. 107-111. 
6 Helpman, E. (2004) op. cit .; Sapienza, R. (2009) Brevi puntualizzazioni sul tema dei rapporti della 
pubblica amministrazione con cittadini e imprese nel Mezzogiorno italiano: il caso delleccessiva 
durata delle procedure giudiziarie, Rivist a Giuridica del  Mezzogiorno, XIII, 3, pp. 951-960.  
7 Cieħlik, A. and Kanieweska, M. (2004) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Regional Economic 
Development: The Case of Poland, Regional St udies, 38, 6, pp. 713-725. 
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the uncertain legal context, which have detrimental impacts on the functioning of the 
capital market and on inward investment attraction.8  
Spending in the above areas does not have a clear-cut effect on regional convergence. The 
impact on regional disparities of investments in these fields depends instead on the wider 
interplay between different factors and policies. For instance, with respect to transport 
infrastructure, it has been argued that the realisation of motorway infrastructure to link 
North and South Italy has had a negative effect on regional convergence by opening the 
Southern regions to the goods produced in the North.9 It has been suggested that a 
distinction needs to be made between transport infrastructure aimed at supporting 
domestic versus international trade. The second type can potentially damage rather than 
develop a countrys lagging regions,10 and regional convergence may be promoted or 
hindered by lower international trade costs depending on the relative level of infra-national 
trade costs, as well as the relative costs of labour and land in different regions, and the 
extent of negative economic externalities, such as congestion, in agglomerations.11 OECD 
research has argued that infrastructure investments have a positive effect on regional 
growth only in the presence of positive externalities in a given region.12   
Telecommunication infrastructures also have an impact on the spatial distribution of 
economic activities. Cieħlik and Kanieweska concluded in their study on Polish regional 
development that there is a positive and statistically significant causal relationship 
between telecommunications infrastructure and the level of income for Polish regions, 
suggesting the need to closely coordinate the two sets of policy.13 
The functioning of the financial market is another important factor in determining regional 
economic growth potential and, where this is uneven across a national territory, the degree 
of convergence amongst regions. Policy instruments in this area are increasingly becoming 
part of the regional policy package, but measures in this field are also used more widely as 
                                                 
8 Chiorazzo, V. (2006) Servizi finanziari e competitività del Mezzogiorno, L’ indust ria, 1, pp. 61-74. 
9 Faini, R. (1983) Cumulative process of deindustrialization in an open region: the case of Southern 
Italy, 19511973, Journal of  Development  Economics, 12, pp. 277301 (quoted in Cieħlik and 
Kanieweska (2004) op. cit ).  Indeed, other authors have criticised Italian regional policy because it 
transformed the Mezzogiorno into a market for the rest of the country, see Lombardini, S. (1992) 
Vecchi e nuovi problemi al sud, in DAntonio, M. (ed.) Il  Mezzogiorno d’ It al ia: svi luppo o 
st agnazione? Il Mulino, Bologna (quoted in Fratesi (2007) op. cit .). 
10 Martin, P. and Rogers, C. A. (1995) Industrial location and public infrastructure, Journal  of  
Int ernat ional  Economics, 39, 34, pp. 152166, quoted in  Fratesi, U. (2007) Regional policy from a 
supra-regional perspective, The Annals of  Regional Science, 42, 3, pp. 681-703. 
11 P. E. Moncarz and M Bleaney (2010) The Regional Impact of Trade Liberalization in a Model with 
Congestion Costs à la Helpman, Regional St udies, 44, 8, 935-947. Puga D. (2002) European regional 
policies in light of recent location theories, Journal of  Economic Geography, 2, pp. 373-406. 
12 OECD (2009) Regions Mat t er. Economic Recovery, Innovat ion and Sust ainable Growt h, Paris, p. 57. 
The report observes that Faster transport connections can exploit potential positive externalities 
that exist in various markets  typically unexhausted economies of scale, scope, agglomeration, 
density or network  and consequently improve (labour) productivity, enhance output, reduce 
production costs and promote more efficient use of resources. If such latent economies do not exist, 
however, improvements in accessibility could lead to changes in existing transport flows and spatial 
patterns without having long-term effects on growth, p. 57. 
13 Cieħlik, A. and Kanieweska, M. (2004) op. cit ., p. 721. 
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instruments for non-spatially discriminated economic development policy. One study on 
venture capital programmes in the UK and Germany suggests that the limited 
regionalisation means that policies are generating a regionally uneven pattern of 
investment.14 On the other hand, research conducted by the Bank of Italy suggests that 
the efficiency of the financial market is affected by environmental factors. In the Italian 
Mezzogiorno, in particular, the high proportion of irregular work, higher incidence of 
economic frauds, the longer times of justice proceedings and the presence of organised 
crime all contribute to render the availability of credit for entrepreneurial investments less 
accessible in this area than in the remainder of the country.15  This suggests the necessity 
of complementing measures to address the deficiencies of the capital market with 
additional measures capable of addressing the wider contextual deficiencies of the area. 
Similar observations can be made on wage bargaining approaches or regulation, and the 
territorial distribution of public sector employment. Although not necessarily viewed as 
regional development policies in the strict sense, measures in these fields have been used 
as a lever to ameliorate GDP disparities in the past by raising the income from labour and 
living standards in lagging regions. For example, both in Italy and in post-reunification 
Germany, wages have been artificially raised to increase per capita incomes in the Italian 
Mezzogiorno and Eastern Länder.  However, this is considered to have resulted in household 
expenditure convergence rather than productivity increases and growth, consequently 
delaying the long-term catch-up of these regions.16  
To summarise, investments in the above policy fields can equally favour or hinder regional 
GDP convergence depending on spatial distribution, financial scale and interaction with 
other variables such as factor mobility.17 This suggests that it is of paramount importance 
to avoid the trap of considering regional policy  and Cohesion policy within it - in isolation 
from other policies. Such a concern is particularly relevant in the EU15 Member States, 
where EU Cohesion policy receipts are relatively low compared to domestic policy budgets, 
as illustrated by column D in Table 1. As a consequence, many of the investments outlined 
above are undertaken as part of domestic policies and spending. However, they are not 
always explicitly regionally targeted or even regionally aware, and they may have 
detrimental effects for the goals of Cohesion policy. 
                                                 
14 Sunley, P., Klagge, B., Berndt, C. and Martin, R. (2005) Venture capital programmes in the UK and 
Germany: In what sense regional policies? Regional St udies, 39, 2, pp. 255-273.  
15 Cannari, L. and Gobbi, G. (2010) Il sistema finanziario, in Cannari, L. and Franco, D. (eds.) Il  
Mezzogiorno e la pol i t ica economica del l ’ It al ia, Seminari e convegni, n. 4, giugno 2010, pp. 51-59; 
Bonaccorsi di Patti, E. (2009) Legalità e credito: limpatto della criminalità sui prestiti alle imprese, 
in Cannari, L. (ed.) Mezzogiorno e pol i t iche regional i, Banca dItalia, Eurosistema, Seminari e 
Convegni, no. 2, November 2009, Roma, pp. 165-189. 
16 Fratesi, U. (2008) op. cit ., p. 683. See also Directorate General for Economics and Financial Affairs 
(2007) Raising Germanys Growth Potential, European Economy Occasional Paper,  28, February 
2007.    
17 Wildasin, D. E. (2000) Factor mobility and fiscal policy in the EU: policy issues and analytical 
approaches, Economic Pol icy, 15, 31, pp. 339-378. 
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Table 1: Cohesion policy average annual expenditure in percentage to government 
annual capital expenditure and GDP (2007 figures) 
Country Cohesion 
policy 2007-
13 average 
annual 
allocations  
(€bn) 
Government 
capital 
expenditure1 
(2007) 
(€bn) 
GDP  
(2007) 
(€bn) 
Cohesion 
policy/  
government 
capital 
expenditure 
Proportion 
of 
Cohesion 
policy/GDP 
Proportion of 
government 
capital 
expenditure/
GDP 
 A B C D 
(A/B) 
 
E 
(A/C) 
 
F 
(B/C) 
 
Austria  0.21 2.8 270.8 7.45 0.08 1.03 
Finland   0.25 4.4 179.5 5.57 0.14 2.45 
France  2.05 62.2 1894.6 3.29 0.11 3.28 
Germany  3.76 34.3 2428.2 10.97 0.15 1.41 
Ireland 0.13 8.4 189.8 1.53 0.07 4.43 
Italy   4.12 35.8 1546.2 11.50 0.27 2.32 
Netherlands  0.27 19.1 568.7 1.43 0.05 3.36 
Poland  9.61 13 311 73.94 3.09 4.18 
Spain 5.03 42.6 1052.7 11.81 0.48 4.05 
Sweden  0.27 10.2 331.1 2.65 0.08 3.08 
United 
Kingdom  1.52 39.8 2044.1 3.81 0.07 1.95 
1. Gross fixed capital formation (general government), used as a proxy for total government capital 
expenditure. All prices are current for 2007.  
Source: EPRC elaboration based on data from DG Regio 
(http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/fonds/pdf/annexe-recto.pdf, DG ECFIN AMECO 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm).  
 
2.2 Domestic policies and the goals of Cohesion policy 
In accordance with the observations discussed above, the EU Treaty (art. 17518) states that 
Member States shall conduct their economic policies and shall coordinate them in such a 
way as, in addition, to attain the objectives set out in Article 174. Whether this is actually 
the case has not been systematically appraised,19 hampered by the absence, in a majority 
of Member States, of monitoring systems that track the distribution of public expenditure 
(beyond regional policy) across a countrys territory. This task is rendered particularly 
difficult by two factors: first, the non-territorialised ex ante articulation of sectoral 
spending (which would thus have to be reconstructed ex post ); and, second, the 
involvement of different levels of government in public spending (which entails both the 
need to monitor the territorial distribution of expenditure at different levels of 
government, and the necessity to provide adequate forms of cross-level strategic 
coordination). The exception to this is Italy, where a database was set up in the mid-1990s 
                                                 
18 Previously art. 159 TEC. 
19 Begg, I. (2008) Subsidiarity in Regional Policy, in Gelauff, G., Grilo, I. and Lejour, A. (eds) 
Subsidiarit y and Economic Reform in Europe (Springer-Verlag, Berlin/Heidelberg, 2008, p. 78). 
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to track expenditure flows at regional and sub-regional levels and is now fully operational -
the Territorial Public Accounts database (see Box 1).20 
Box 1: The Italian Territorial Public Accounts database (Conti Pubblici Territoriali) 
Set up in 1994, but only progressively implemented, the database provides detailed information 
on all capital public spending disaggregated regionally from 1996 onwards. It includes data on 
expenditure by the public administration and the so-called enlarged public sector, i.e. the 
expenditure realised by publicly-owned companies that provide public services at both national 
and sub-national level, such as those that manage the railways (Ferrovie del lo St at o SpA), roads 
(ANAS) and the energy network (ENEL), and the local public utilities that typically operate in the 
fields of water, energy and waste (for instance the Roman Acea or Emilia Romagnas Hera).   
Data are drawn from the final (ex post) accounts (bilancio consunt ivo) of the 
administrations/public utilities monitored, tracking down the income and expenditure 
effectively realised. The time lag between the data produced and the expenditure realised is 
12-18 months. The data are produced through a network of regional units and drawn up and 
maintained centrally by a Central Technical Unit.  They can be consulted online by the public at 
http://www.dps.tesoro.it/cpt/banca_dati_home.asp. Since 2005, the database has been part of 
the National Statistical System (SISTAN, National Statistics Programme).  
 
Fieldwork research in the EoRPA sponsor countries has highlighted important tensions 
between Cohesion policy (and regional policy more generally where applicable) and other 
policies implemented domestically and the broader macro-economic framework. These 
relate to the overall spatial distribution of capital public expenditure, labour market, 
welfare and social protection, rural policy, and transport policy. These examples do not 
represent a comprehensive account of all potential tensions, but rather an illustration of 
the issues based on EoRPA field-research. They are briefly explored in the paragraphs to 
follow.  
Before turning to the analysis of the external tensions of Cohesion policy with other policies 
implemented domestically in the Member States, it is useful to recall that there are also 
countries in which domestic economic and sectoral policies are not perceived as conflicting 
with the goals of regional development (e.g. Austria, the Netherlands, Finland and 
Sweden). In some cases, this is a result of the limited scale of the regional problem 
and/or relatively small (compared to the domestic budget) financial input provided by 
Cohesion policy. Where regional problems are greater, and the scale of EU funding more 
significant, however, the lack of obvious tension seems to be due also to the existence of 
                                                 
20 Although in other countries, notably Finland, the appraisal of the spatial effects of different 
domestic policies is carried out periodically, generally in preparation for the start of a new policy 
cycle (the last time at the beginning of 2000 as part of a wider evaluation). This is consistent with the 
concept of broad regional policy that is applied in this Country and the commitment contained in 
the Regional Development Act for both vertical and horizontal (sectoral) policy coordination with the 
principles and goals of the Act. Interestingly, there were plans to introduce a system for the 
monitoring of the regional impact of all policies in Ireland (i.e. the policies contained within the 
2007-13 National Development Plan and 2002-2020 National Spatial Strategy), but these were shelved 
following the economic crisis. 
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mechanisms or tools for cross-sectoral coordination or to umbrella policy frameworks. 
These measures are discussed in Section 3. 
2.3 Overall spatial distribution of capital public expenditure  
Capital public expenditure is the part of public expenditure that is directly linked to 
development: it comprises expenditure for public investments and transfers to the 
productive system.21 From the perspective of regional policy, capital public expenditure 
overall can be divided into mainstream and spatially-targeted spending.22 The first is the 
expenditure undertaken by the State (in its different territorial articulations) across the 
national territory, for instance in the fields of education, transport and healthcare. The 
second comprises the public resources devoted explicitly to regional development, i.e. for 
the economic development of lagging regions, however they may be defined. 23 Depending 
on the country, and particularly depending on whether that country has a domestic regional 
policy in addition to the regional policy co-financed by the European Union, the spatially 
targeted component of public spending is composed of the Structural Funds and the 
related domestic co-financing (i.e. Cohesion policy), plus, where applicable, other spatially 
targeted public spending represented by the resources allocated to domestic regional 
policy. 
In principle, the ring-fencing of capital resources for specific territories can occur in two 
ways: first, with the setting of a minimum target of spatially-targeted capital spending for 
the lagging regions, to be achieved in addition to the mainstream spending (as was 
attempted, until recently, in Italy); and, second, with the establishment of ad hoc capital 
spending programmes for target regions, which are implemented in addition to mainstream 
spending programmes (as in Germany). However, both approaches present specific tensions 
and challenges.  
By definition, the spatially targeted component of capital public spending is inferior to its 
mainstream counterpart (although in proportions that will vary from country to country). 
For this reason, the overall spatial allocation of the mainstream component of public 
capital expenditure can have important consequences for the attainment of regional policy 
goals or for the evolution of regional disparities across a country. For instance, if the 
spatially targeted spending effort is more than counterbalanced in areas not targeted by 
regional policy by a more-than-proportional allocation of mainstream public spending, this 
will hamper the capacity of regional policy to deliver its aims. This is a point that has 
emerged as particularly controversial in Italy, despite the sizeable amount of additional 
spending, which represents circa one-fourth of the overall public capital spending.24 
                                                 
21 As opposed to current expenditure, which is the expenditure for salaries and other ordinary running 
costs of the public administration. Viesti, G. (2009) Mezzogiorno a t radiment o. Il  Nord, i l  Sud e la 
pol i t ica che non c’ è (Laterza, Bari). 
22 Viesti, G. (2009) op. cit ., p. 48.  
23 In Italy, these two categories of expenditure are denominated ordinary and additional. See 
Viesti, G. (2009) op. cit ., p. 48; Ministero dellEconomia e delle Finanze (2002) Quart o Rapport o del  
Dipart iment o per le Pol it iche di Sviluppo 2000-2001, Rome, 2002, p. 63 and subsequent annual 
reports by the same department.  
24 Viesti, G. (2009) op. cit . 
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Equally, it is important that the capital spending set aside for the lagging regions is utilised 
for capital investments. However, the experience of the German East ern Länder suggests 
that this may be challenging if mainstream capital resources or current expenditure are not 
sufficient to cover the public finance needs of lagging territories; in such cases, funding 
intended for additional capital expenditure may be vired (transferred) to other spending 
areas which may not directly contribute to growth. 
Italy is an interesting example in this respect. The main targets of Italian regional policy 
are the eight Mezzogiorno regions, for which 85 percent of the domestic regional policy 
budget is ring-fenced (the Fund for Underutilised Areas, FAS). These regions comprise the 
four regions that are also eligible for the Convergence Objective and are thus the largest 
recipients of Cohesion policy in Italy. However, if one looks at the territorial distribution of 
overall public capital spending, it is apparent that, net of regional policy transfers, these 
regions receive less than their fair share, with the consequence that regional policy 
resources are used to fund investments that in the remainder of the country are funded by 
mainstream resources.25  
Subsequent Italian Governments from 200126 to 2007 have set a target of achieving a quota 
of total public capital expenditure in the Mezzogiorno (i.e. mainstream plus spatially-
targeted) of 45 percent. This was to be achieved gradually by increasing the share of 
mainstream capital expenditure in this macro-area to 30 percent, an intermediate measure 
between its GDP and population share (respectively of 24 and 36 percent).27 However, 
these targets have never been achieved in practice and were both de facto suppressed, 
having disappeared from the annual Economic and Financial Documents since 2008. In real 
terms, capital expenditure in the period 2001-06 in fact increased in the Centre-North and 
decreased in the South, rather than the other way around.28 
Academics and policymakers have argued that the result of this favourable allocation of 
public capital expenditure in the Centre-North has been the use of regional policy resources 
to compensate for a lack of mainstream resources investments in the Mezzogiorno, with the 
consequence that regional policy in the South has ended up financing investments that in 
the remainder of the country are undertaken via mainstream capital public spending 
resources, and which results in a loss of additionality with regard to Cohesion policy.29 
                                                 
25 Indagine conoscit iva sul l ’ ef f icacia del la spesa e del le pol i t iche di sost egno al le aree 
sot t out i l izzat e. Commissione V, Bilancio, tesoro e programmazione. Indagine conoscitiva, 27 January 
2010.  
26 Since the Economic and Financial Programming Document for the period 2002-2006. Ministero 
dellEconomia e delle finanze (2001) Document o di programmazione economico-f inanziaria 2002-2006 
(approvat o dal  Consigl io dei Minist ri  del  16 lugl io 2001), p. 4. 
27 Ministero dellEconomia e delle finanze (2002) Document o di programmazione economico-
f inanziaria per gl i  anni 2003-2006 present at o dal  presidente del  Consigl io dei Minist ri  Si lvio 
Berlusconi e dal  Minist ro del l ’ Economia e del le Finanze Giul io Tremont i, Deliberato dal Consiglio dei 
Ministri il 5 luglio 2002, p. 122.   
28 Viesti, G. (2009) op.cit ., p. 54. 
29 Viesti, G. (2009) op. cit ., p. 55; Indagine conoscit iva sul l ’ ef f icacia del la spesa e del le pol i t iche di 
sost egno al le aree sot t out i l izzat e. Commissione V, Bilancio, tesoro e programmazione. Indagine 
conoscitiva. 
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Similar issues have been raised about the distribution of current (rather than capital) 
expenditure which, it is argued, also has an anti-redistributive effect in the country (though 
this is a complex issue and one that would require more detailed examination).30 
An opposite example to the Italian case is represented by the experience of Sweden. On 
the one hand, equal living standards and essential service provision across the country are 
ensured via important equalisation mechanisms,31 social security transfers and universal 
healthcare provision. On the other hand, the coordination of regional policy (both EU co-
funded and domestic) is ensured through a number of cross-sectoral and cross-level 
coordination mechanisms, as discussed in Section 4, and regional policy intervenes 
specifically to allow regions to grow while fully exploiting their differentiated potential.32 
In Germany, the most significant programme of spatially-targeted capital spending is the 
Solidarity Pact (Sol idarpakt ). This provides the Eastern Länder additional funding for capital 
spending and also finances a range of federal interventions exclusively available to these 
Länder in fields such as infrastructure networks, business support and training. It was set up 
in 1995, initially for a period of ten years, with the aim of closing the gap in terms of the 
quantity and quality of core infrastructure between the old and new Länder. A second 
Solidarity Pact was then agreed for the 2005-19 period, with total funding amounting to 
156 billion, including the following.33 
x 105 billion of additional federal funding to the Eastern Länder 
(Sonderbedarfsbundesergänzungszuweisungen - SoBEZ), mainly for infrastructure 
investments. Funding will gradually fall from 10,533 million in 2005 to 2,096 
million in 2019. 
x 51 billion of additional federal funding, to be spent by federal agencies, aimed 
at improving competitiveness, employment and infrastructure in the new Länder. 
This includes additional federal resources allocated to the new Länder, for 
regional investment programmes that are also available to the Western Länder, 
for example the Joint Task for the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures 
(Gemeinschaf t saufgabe 'Verbesserung der regionalen Wirt schaf t sst ruktur’  or the 
                                                 
30 Viesti, G. (2009) op. cit ., pp. 68-91, argued that of a national average of per capita current 
spending of 14,141, the 8 Mezzogiorno regions account only for an average of 11,253 and the total 
public spending (capital + current) of the enlarged public sector of the Mezzogiorno represents only 
28.3 percent of the total, against a population share of 35.9 percent. See also Ministero dello Sviluppo 
Economico (2008) Rapport o Annuale 2007 del  Dipart iment o per le Pol it iche di Sviluppo e di Coesione 
sugl i int ervent i nel le aree sot t out i l izzat e, Rome, 2008, p. 118; and Ministero dellEconomia e delle 
Finanze (2006) Rapport o Annuale 2005 del  Dipart iment o per le Pol it iche di Sviluppo e di Coesione 
sugl i int ervent i nel le aree sot t out i l izzat e, Rome, 2005, p. 167. 
31 Such as the equalisation grant for municipalities and county councils, a grant for pharmaceutical 
benefits for county councils and several targeted grants to municipalities. 
32 OECD (2010) Territ orial  Reviews: Sweden, p. 147. It should be noted, however, that according to 
OECD data, territorial disparities in terms of GDP per capita in this country have widened, and 
Swedens economy is the second most concentrated among OECD countries. 
33 Source: Bundesministerium des Innern, 
http://www.bmi.bund.de/cln_156/SharedDocs/Standardartikel/BODL/soliII.html?nn=790654 . 
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GRW), the Investment Allowance and federal schemes in support of innovation 
and enterprise.34 
The Eastern Länder are responsible for allocating the SoBEZ funds, and they have been 
obliged, since 2002, to provide an annual progress report to the Bund-Länder Financial 
Planning Council (Finanzplanungsamt ), with information on the use of these funds, progress 
in reducing infrastructure gaps, and the Land's fiscal situation. This monitoring has 
highlighted that, despite the remit of the Pact, most of the beneficiary Länder have in fact 
used the Solidarity Pact resources to fund current expenditure, rather than investments.35 
This is largely because of the considerable fiscal pressures faced by the eastern Länder, 
whose weak tax bases make them dependent on transfers and not able to cope with the 
extensive spending obligations relating to the provision of public services and staff wages.  
Nevertheless, as the overall level of net capital transfers from West to East (including social 
transfers) remains considerable - c. 70 billion in 2004, compared to the 100 billion of the 
mid 1990s peak36 - this has prompted considerable debate over the necessity of re-thinking 
the support to the Eastern Länder, especially in the context of the current public 
expenditure restrains. The progressive phasing-out of the Solidarity Pact is one outcome of 
this debate, but one which is not without challenges. In order to compensate for this 
reduction in assistance, the Eastern Länder will need to raise the level of their own 
resources, for example by encouraging stronger business activity and thus higher business 
tax receipts, but this may be hampered by the persisting relative weakness of the Eastern 
Länder economies.  
The issues discussed above lead to a fundamental consideration with respect to the role 
and potential of regional policy: one may argue that this policy can only deliver growth and 
growth-induced catching-up if other, mainstream policies pave the ground for this goal, for 
instance ensuring that adequate service provision is maintained in the lagging territories 
through the use of mainstream resources.37 This is the view expressed in Italy in a recent 
seminar by the Governor of the Bank of Italy, according to whom:  
                                                 
34 For a more detailed description of these schemes, see Davies S. (2010) Fiscal Consolidation and 
Budget Cuts: Regional Policy Developments in Germany, in EPRC (2010) Regional Pol icy and Recovery 
f rom t he Economic Crisis: Count ry Reviews, EoRPA Paper 10/2, EPRC, Glasgow, pp. 75-94. 
35 Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung (2005) Jahresbericht  zum St and der 
Deut schen Einheit , Berlin. 
36 European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (2007) Country 
Study: Raising Germanys Growth Potential, European Economy Occasional Papers, no. 28, Brussels, 
February 2007, p. 14. See also Jansen H. (2004) Transfers to Germanys eastern Länder: a necessary 
price for convergence or a permanent drag?, ECFIN Count ry Focus, 1, 16, 8.10.2004. 
37 As noted by the current head of the Department for Development Policies and Economic Cohesion, 
the national commitment for the development of the South, whilst recognised in the economic 
objectives and documents, has not been reinforced (avvalorat o) by institutional and administrative 
practices aimed at integrating in the overall economic policy the need of lagging areas and at binding 
them to qualitative targets. Some national policies with relevant regional effects, such as education, 
justice, competition, security and the improvement of public administration, should support the goals 
of regional policy and be strengthened in these territories. Mancurti, A. (2010) Test imonianza 
al l ’ indagine conoscit iva Commissione V Bilancio, Tesoro e Programmazione, resocont o st enograf ico, 
seduta di mercoledì 27 gennaio 2010, p. 5. 
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Regional pol icies can integrat e t he available resources, al lowing an increased 
t errit orial  concent rat ion, cont rast ing negat ive external it ies and st rengt hening t he 
posit ive ones. But  t hey cannot  subst it ut e t he good funct ioning of  ordinary 
inst it ut ions. The rout e of  regional  pol icies is not  t he main route (via maestra) for 
closing t he gap bet ween Mezzogiorno and Cent re-Nort h. It  is necessary t o direct  
t he commitment  especial ly t owards t he general pol icies, which have obj ect ives 
referred t o t he whole count ry, and concent rate on t he environment al  condit ions 
t hat  render t heir appl icat ion more dif f icul t  and less ef fect ive in some 
areas.38(emphasis added) 
These considerations echo a similar warning by the European Commission (DG ECFIN) that 
[h] igh long-run growt h requires an appropriat e mix of  nat ional pol icies and 
condit ions t hat  remove impediments t o accumulat ion and ef f icient  al locat ion of  
resources. Such a mix includes macroeconomic stabil i t y, support ive inst it ut ions, 
t he smoot h funct ioning of  market s, openness and ot her element s. Publ ic 
investment  programmes co-f inanced by EU St ruct ural  Funds are a signif icant  
ingredient  t o t his panoply. However, t heir ef f iciency is condit ional  upon t he 
implement at ion of  nat ional  pol icies as evidenced by some st riking dif ferences in 
growth performance in t he EU-15 despit e similar relat ive magnit ude in St ructural  
Funds al locat ions. 39(emphasis added) 
2.4 Labour market regulation and functioning 
One issue that has been discussed extensively over the past decade, again in Germany and 
Italy, is the question of whether the centralised approach to wage bargaining generates a 
structural disadvantage to businesses in the new Länder/South of Italy and a disincentive 
for firms to locate in these areas.40  
In both countries, wage bargaining occurs at sectoral level so that sectoral agreements on 
wage increases and changes in working conditions apply automatically to all firms within 
the sector, regardless of their location, as long as they are members of the relevant 
sectoral employers associations.41 As there are differences in productivity levels between 
regions (e.g. due to differences in levels of skill, business capital, market access and public 
administration efficiency), it is argued that these higher  compared to productivity  costs 
in the lagging regions will disadvantage them. Firms will choose to locate in regions with 
higher productivity levels or better conditions where, given the same levels of salary, the 
                                                 
38 Draghi, M. (2009) Int ervento di apert ura del Governat ore del la Banca d’ It al ia Mario Draghi al  
Seminario ‘ Il  Mezzogiorno e la pol it ica economica del l ’ It al ia’ ,  Rome, 26 November 2009, p. 6. 
Unofficial translation from Italian by the authors. 
39 European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (2000) The EU 
Economy: 2000 Review, European Economy, 71, 2000, p. 204. 
40 OECD (2001) Economic Survey: Germany, Paris; Wurzel, E. (2001) The economic int egrat ion of  
Germany’ s new Länder, OECD Working Paper No. 307; OECD (2004) Economic Survey: Germany, Paris; 
OECD (2006) Economic Survey: Germany, Paris; European Commission (2002) Broad Economic Pol icy 
Guidel ines 2002, European Economy No. 4, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs; 
European Commission (2003) Recommendat ion on t he Broad Guidel ines of  t he Economic Pol icies of  
t he Member St at es and t he Communit y (for t he 2003-2005 period), Brussels, 24.4.2003, COM (2003) 
170 final/2. 
41 In Italy, certain sectors and types of workers (e.g. temporary or occasional workers) are not 
covered by such collective bargaining. 
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cost of labour per unit produced is lower.42 This has led to considerable debate about the 
opportunity to render wage bargaining more flexible to align wages to actual levels of 
productivity.  
In Germany, the salaries of the Eastern Länder in 1990, when the German currency was 
unified, were about one third of those in the Western Länder. 43 Wage convergence was 
rapidly pursued.44 Although not fully achieved  as most of the new firms founded in East 
Germany after 1991 decided not to join the employers unions in order not to be covered by 
the initial wage agreements, and many other firms have simply violated the wage contracts 
with the tacit agreement of the unions, [or] went bankrupt and were founded again as 
new legal entities in order to circumvent the binding power of the collective wage 
contracts45  the result has been a considerable misalignment with productivity.46 This is 
thought to have had negative consequences for the eastern economies, having hampered 
employment growth, favoured out-migration, limited private investments and prevented 
productivity improvements.  
As a response, a greater degree of flexibility has developed over the past decade in the 
wage-bargaining system in Germany, allowing firms to opt out of the centralised bargaining 
system by choosing not to join the sectoral employers associations. The level of opt-outs is 
significantly higher in the new Länder, allowing firms in those locations to compensate for 
the less-favourable business conditions. In 2004, only 10 percent of companies and 30 
percent of employees in the Eastern Länder were covered by collectively negotiated 
wages.47  
In Italy, on the other hand, employers and employees have the possibility of resorting to 
integrative contractual arrangements at the level of individual firms (cont rat t azione 
aziendale int egrat iva). However, this avenue can only introduce salary increases to the 
nationally agreed contracts, which acts as a strong disincentive for employers to sign 
                                                 
42 The other side of the coin should also be acknowledged, namely that national bargaining also has 
the effect of containing the increase of wages in the more productive parts of these countries (i.e. 
Western Germany and Centre-North Italy). See Casadio, P. (2009) Cont rat t azione aziendale 
int egrat iva e dif ferenzial i  salarial i  t erri t orial i :  informazione dal l ’ indagine sul le imprese del la Banca 
d’ It al ia, in Cannari, L. (2009) op. cit ., p. 130. 
43 Sinn H. W. and Westermann F. (2000) Two Mezzogiorno, CESifo Working Paper, no. 378, 
December 2000, p. 16. 
44 Different studies emphasise different causes for this.  Whilst Sinn H. W. and Westermann F. (2000, 
p. 20) point to the role of Western Trade Unions and Employers Associations in the 1991 wage 
negotiations, Davies S. and Hallet M. (2001, p. 24) identify three underlying political reasons: first, 
the initial optimism on the timetable of the Eastern Länder catching-up; second, the prevention of 
East-to-West migration; and, third equity considerations, according to which the same salary should 
be corresponded for the same job (not dissimilar to those which had led, in Italy, to the abolition of 
the so-called salary cages). 
45 Sinn H. W. and Westermann F. (2000) op. cit ., p. 20. 
46 Ibid, p. 16.  
47 H. Jansen (2004) Transfers to Germanys eastern Länder: a necessary price for convergence or a 
permanent drag?, EcFin Count ry Focus, 1, 16, 8.10.2004, p. 5. The same study notes that other 
factors too have contributed to the halting of wage convergence in recent years, notably the loss of 
power by the trade unions due to the high unemployment levels and the closure of vulnerable 
companies. 
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integrative contracts.48 As a consequence, the use of integrative firm-based bargaining in 
Italy is limited,49 especially in the Mezzogiorno.50 This outcome has produced considerable 
debate about the necessity, in the view of many economists, to reduce wages in this area 
of the country to align them with productivity, also in the light of the lower real costs of 
living in the Mezzogiorno compared to the remainder of the country.51 Nevertheless, views 
diverge both on the real extent of the disparity in costs of living52 - given that most 
statistics consider the nominal cost differential between comparable services and products, 
rather than their effective attainment potential53 - and on the effective utility of such a 
measure, which would essentially be aimed at improving the competitiveness of firms by 
lowering production costs (notably labour costs), rather than investing in factors that would 
improve their longer-term competitiveness and make the area more attractive as an 
investment location.54 Alternative measures proposed include the introduction of minimum 
wages and the exemption of lower-end salaries from taxation, both of which would 
especially benefit the Mezzogiorno, because that is where the lower-paid employment is 
concentrated, as well as the irregular employment that such measures would aim to 
counteract.  
Apart from the issue of national bargaining, the existence of a legally set minimum wage 
and the level at which this should be fixed have been subject to debate from a regional 
policy perspective. A considerable amount of literature has focussed on the impact of 
minimum salaries on growth and employment/unemployment,55 including research on the 
spatially diversified effects of the minimum wage and the degree to which statutory 
minimum salaries should be diversified territorially to reflect different productivity levels 
and labour markets. A recent study by the European Commission has argued that, in 
Poland, for example, the nationally-set minimum wage is too high in lagging regions 
compared to the market-clearing level, with negative consequences for low-skilled workers 
                                                 
48 Boeri, T. (2006) Per il Mezzogiorno, ma non solo per il Mezzogiorno, L’ indust ria, XXVII, 1, 2006, 
pp. 103-106. 
49 Boeri, T. (2006) op. cit . 
50 Casadio, P. (2009) op. cit .  
51 Viesti in his book (2009, op. cit .) reports many of these, see pp. 181-185. The debate has included 
calls for the reintroduction of the so-called salary cages, abolished in 1969. See EoRPA Paper 09/3, 
p. 79. 
52 E.g. where nominal advantages in the cost of house renting in the Mezzogiorno are compensated by 
the lower quantity and quality of public services, such access to nurseries, adequate healthcare or 
schooling (see Viesti 2009, op. cit ., pp. 184-186). 
53 Bettio and Mazzotta make this point quoting the example of nursery costs whereby the average cost 
for a typical family of three is of 364 in the North, 280 in the Centre and 221 in the Mezzogiorno, 
but this measure does not take into account that the availability of nursery places is much more 
limited in the Mezzogiorno than in the rest of the country, close to only 1 percent in Apulia, Sicily and 
Calabria. A more accurate estimate of the cost of living, they argue, would take into account the cost 
necessary for the attainment of the same level of service. Bettio, F. and Mazzotta, F. (2009) Gabbie 
salariali? Meglio lindennità locale, Lavoce.info, 20.11.2009. 
54 Viesti, G. (2009) op. cit . 
55 See Cahuc, P. and Michel, P. (1995) Minimum wage unemployment and growth, European 
Economic Review, 40, 7, pp. 1463-1482. 
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who are crowded out by better qualified workers.56 This has prompted the OECD to call for 
a regional differentiation of the minimum wage in this country, based on local labour 
market conditions.57 Similar debates occurred in the United Kingdom following the 
introduction of minimum wage in 1999.58 
2.5 Welfare and social protection  
Welfare and social protection spending and policies also present important implications for 
the development of lagging regions and their catching-up, because the expenditure for 
these areas affects different regions differently. Welfare and social protection spending 
typically includes pensions, unemployment benefits, invalidity payments, family allowances 
and housing benefits. The relative share of these different headings and the spatial 
distribution of spending vary depending on the economic policy choices and demographic 
and economic structure of each country. For example, in some countries spending for old-
age pensions is likely to be concentrated in the most economically advanced regions, where 
employment has been traditionally high and employees have matured the right to pensions 
through their contributions, and lower in areas of high concentration of unemployment and 
irregular employment.59 Accordingly, there may be tensions between the goals pursued by 
regional policy and the welfare system.  
An illustration of the potential tension between regional policy and welfare spending can be 
found in Poland, where specific welfare provisions are in place for the support of farmers. 
These include support for farms that are not economically profitable, exemptions for 
farmers from income tax and most property taxes, and support for unemployed farmers 
(Farmers Social Insurance Fund, KRUS). This fund supports c.1.5 million pensioners and 
entails a public expenditure estimated as equal to 1.2 percent of Polish GDP.60 Because it 
                                                 
56 As the minimum wage is above the market clearing level and employers tend to hire better-skilled 
workers in these circumstances [] workers with basic vocational education or less, account for 
almost three-quarters of all the unemployed, with the two-thirds of them who live in rural areas 
particularly susceptible to increased unemployment after the liquidation of state-owned farms, 
Naroĳny, M. (2006) High unemployment in Poland  not only a labour market problem, ECFIN Count ry 
Focus, III, 6, pp. 1-6. 
57 OECD (2010) OECD Economic Surveys: Poland, Paris, p. 81. 
58 Sunley, P. and Martin, R. (2003) The geographies of a national minimum wage: the case of the UK, 
in Martin, R. and Morrison, P. R. (eds.) (2003) Geographies of  Labour Market  Inequal it y (Routledge, 
London, 2003, pp. 208-233). 
59 For instance, with respect to Italy, the work by Staderini and Vadalà (2010) shows that because of 
the different demographic structure and social security contribution history of Mezzogiorno and 
Centre-North, the per capita expenditure on social security is higher in the North and Centre than  in 
the Mezzogiorno (respectively 4,900 and 4,800, versus 3,600). At the same time, they point out 
that if one considers the entire primary expenditure net of social security, there appears a much 
more balanced picture, with the Centre leading with a spend of 5,500 per head, followed by the 
Mezzogiorno with 5,300 and by the North with 5,000. Staderini, A. and Valdalà, E. (2010) Bilancio 
pubblico e flussi redistributivi regionali, in Cannari, L. L. and Franco, D. (eds.) Il  Mezzogiorno e la 
pol it ica economica del l ’ It al ia, Seminari e convegni, n. 4, giugno 2010, pp. 157-167. Although it should 
also be mentioned that in some countries, e.g. in France or the UK, there exists also a considerable 
phenomenon of pensioners migration from congested and more expensive urban centres, to areas 
with higher quality and lower cost of living (e.g. the South West of England and Southern France). 
60 OECD (2010) OECD Economic Surveys: Poland, Paris, p. 42. Public resources cover 90 percent of the 
fund, the remainder is provided by the contributions by the circa 1.5 active ensured. 
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rewards unemployment in rural regions, rather than incentivising farmers to re-train and 
re-enter the labour market, a recent European Commission study has assessed the Fund as 
detrimental to the Cohesion policy goals of economic development and diversification of 
rural areas. The study notes:  
KRUS is among t he fact ors t hat  t ie people t o low product ive agricul t ure and 
subsequent ly de-act ivate t hem in relat ively poor agricul t ure-dependent  regions, 
t hereby cont ribut ing t o slower rest ruct uring and growt h in such regions. Ult imately, 
KRUS may be one of  t he causes of  t he persistency of  regional income disparit ies. 
Poorer regions, wit h less demand for processed product s and sophist icat ed services, 
of fer fewer al t ernat ive j ob opportunit ies, t hus creat ing an environment  for 
inact ivit y and closing a vicious circle of  low labour act ivit y and slow growt h.61  
These findings are echoed by the latest OECD Country Survey for Poland, according to 
which the overly generous social and taxation system for farmers (including KRUS for 
Pensions []) means that huge rents are maintained that slow restructuring, inhibit labour 
mobility and waste labour resources.62   
2.6 Rural policy  
The coordination between Cohesion policy and rural policy is particularly controversial in a 
number of countries, where the goals of Cohesion policy are considered to be hampered by 
spending under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) or domestic rural policies. Evidence 
of tensions between the two policies has been found in Poland.  
In Poland, a high proportion of the population (17 percent) is employed in the agricultural 
sector, despite the declining contribution of agriculture to the economy.63 However, the 
structure of Polish agriculture is considerably differentiated territorially. Whereas farming 
in the West is modern, productive and competitive, agriculture in the North is in need for 
restructuring after the collapse of State-owned farms that dominated this area, causing a 
considerable level of unemployment.  Agriculture in the East suffers from weak 
infrastructure, low productivity and high hidden unemployment. As a result, agricultural 
structure is a key feature of the East/West territorial cleavage that informs Polish regional 
policy, and the diversification of the rural economy is a key goal of Cohesion policy in 
Poland. The new National Strategy for Regional Development prioritises support to rural 
areas with the lowest level of inhabitants, to strengthen their access to pro-development 
goods and services, and several Regional Operational Programmes co-financed by ERDF 
include priorities aimed at the diversification and development of rural areas. However, 
efforts made on this front are effectively counteracted by the direct subsidies provided to 
Polish farmers under the Common Agricultural Policy. These subsidies are easier for farmers 
to absorb than the support provided through the ERDF programmes, because they do not 
                                                 
61 Rutkowski, A. (2009) Impact of social expenditure on regional disparities in Poland, ECFIN Count ry 
Focus, 6, 3, pp. 1-6.  
62 OECD (2010) OECD Economic Surveys: Poland, Paris, p. 131. For a more detailed description of 
KRUS, see p. 42. 
63 In 1999, agriculture represented 5.4 percent of Polish GVA; in 2006 this had decreased to 4.3 
percent. See Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (2009) Rozwój  regionalny w polsce: raport  2009, p. 
9. 
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require the development of difficult applications and strategic plans. However, they are 
not conducive to restructuring and diversification. For most small Polish farms, these 
subsidies act as social transfers. Instead of facilitating the modernisation and growth of 
average farm size or economic diversification, they contribute  together with the social 
security system discussed above  to the petrification of existing structures.64  
These policy tensions underlie problems with the coordination of the funds available under 
Cohesion policy and the CAP. Such coordination is particularly crucial given the importance 
of the latter in Poland and the rising urban/metropolitan versus rural gap. There are three 
facets to this issue: a dual governance framework for agriculture and rural policy that 
reflects the separation between Cohesion policy and CAP at European level; a different 
approach to, and understanding of, rural development in the two lead ministries; and, as a 
consequence of these two points, a poor degree of coordination between the two 
ministries.65  
The transfer of the rural development instruments from Cohesion policy to the Common 
Agricultural Policy in the 2005 financial perspectives66 has also limited the effectiveness of 
the actions implemented under Cohesion policy in integrating urban and rural areas.67 
According to the OECD, rural policy in Poland would benefit significantly from being framed 
not as an extension of agricultural policy but as a dimension of regional policy.68 However, 
the two ministries hold different views, as the Ministry of Agriculture still has a 
predominantly sectoral, agricultural focus and subsidy-oriented approach (even if its 
perspective is considered to be broadening). For instance, the Rural Areas Development 
Plan for 2004-2006, allocating EU (pillar II of CAP) and national resources, de fact o 
concentrated its goals on farms and farmers rather than on inhabitants of rural areas in 
general.69 The Ministry of Regional Development perceives rural development from a 
broader perspective, but the two seem to progress in parallel tracks.  
                                                 
64 Zawaliĝska, K. (2009) Evaluat ion of  rural  development  programs af t er Poland’ s accession t o EU: 
regional CGE approach, Paper prepared for presentation at the International Association of 
Agricultural Economists Conference, Beijing, China, 16-22 August.  
65 Domestically, the governance framework for rural development mirrors the separation, at the 
European level, between Cohesion policy and CAP (and that of the related instruments  ERDF and 
EAFRD). Thus, the Polish Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for the design and implementation of 
rural development strategies and for the implementation of CAP, whilst the Ministry of Regional 
Development is in charge of Cohesion policy. Coordination between the two has been limited. 
Moreover, whilst the ERDF Regional Operational Programmes are managed by regional self-
governments (several of which include rural development priorities, as above noted), it is the Ministry 
of Agriculture that manages a single, sectoral Operational Programme for Rural Development funded 
by EAFRD, which is implemented in part through its regional agencies (ARMiR). This results in a 
complex, and not very coordinated, dual-governance framework in the regions. 
66 The Council of the European Union (2005) Not e f rom Presidency t o t he European Council .  Financial 
Perspect ives 2007-2013. CADREFIN268, Brussels 19 December 2005, 15915/05. 
67 Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (2010) Poland St rat egic Report  2009: Nat ional St rat egic 
Reference Framework, p. 16. 
68 OECD (2008) Territ orial  review: Poland, p. 204. 
69 Buãkowska, M. (2007) Ocena realizacji programu PROW w Polsce w latach 2004-2006, in Roczniki  
Naukowe, Vol. IX,  No. 2. 
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Concern over this somewhat artificial divide between regional policy and rural policy is 
echoed in other countries (e.g. Austria and the UK), where the separation of the two policy 
areas at EU and domestic levels, coupled with the requirements for ensuring that there is 
no double-funding under the EAFRD and ERDF, has led to an emphasis on differentiation 
rather than coordination.  
2.7 Transport infrastructure investments 
A further policy with important implications for regional development and catching-up is 
transport policy. Tensions between the two policies have been noted in Sweden, where 
equalisation mechanisms exist to ensure that citizens have access to an even provision of 
public services and equal living standards irrespective of where they live. Swedish regional 
policy is growth-oriented and operates in all regions, with the goal of ensuring that all 
regions contribute to national growth according to their own potential (thus not aiming to 
achieve the same level of growth in all regions). The provision of transport infrastructure is 
particularly relevant to both goals, given the peripherality and harsh climate of the 
Northern regions, which make them less connected with international markets and less 
interconnected, and the more general lower-than-average accessibility of many Swedish 
regions compared to OECD countries.70 However, research by the OECD highlights that for 
the goal of regional growth, infrastructure policy should be more closely integrated with 
other sectoral policies as part of a coherent regional development strategy, given that 
transport infrastructure investments deliver growth only in the presence of positive 
externalities.71 It is argued that transport infrastructure alone has little impact on regional 
growth  and indeed could even be detrimental - unless it is associated with investments in 
human capital and innovation.72 In Sweden, particular potential in this respect was noted 
with regard to closer collaboration among relevant authorities (at all levels) in the fields of 
transport, housing and spatial planning policy.73 
Such considerations on the need to integrate infrastructure in the wider policy framework 
are also apparent in Italy. The Italian government has both carried out a reorientation of 
domestic regional policy in favour of strategic infrastructure investments (with the 
Strategic Infrastructure Fund) and announced a further such reorientation in the 
                                                 
70 Many regions have poorer (in comparison to other OECD regions) accessibility to international 
markets (except Stockholm and the south of the country), and many also have lower motorway 
density (except Östra Mellansverige, which is the east of the country). In addition, intra-regional 
connections remain somewhat weak in many northern areas. 
71 OECD (2009) Regions Mat t er. Economic Recovery, Innovat ion and Sust ainable Growt h, Paris, p. 57. 
72 The leaking by linking phenomenon, whereby well-intentioned infrastructure projects eventually 
exacerbate brain drain, because mono-sectoral policies fail to enhance the overall business and living 
environment. OECD (2009) ibid. 
73 OECD (2010) Territ orial  Reviews: Sweden, pp. 13-14; Tillväxtverket (2010) ‘ Ti l lväxt fakt a, Så växer 
Sverige och dess regioner, April, pp. 121, 124 & 125. 
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forthcoming months.74 What this will entail in practice and how this reorientation will be 
coordinated with the strategy of the current NSRF are not yet known.  
                                                 
74 See Polverari L (2010) Policies in Flux: Regional Policy Developments in Italy, 2009-2010, in in EPRC 
(2010) Regional Pol icy and Recovery f rom t he Economic Crisis: Count ry Reviews, EoRPA Paper 10/2, 
EPRC, Glasgow, pp. 115-137. 
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3. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COHESION POLICY AND 
DOMESTIC REGIONAL POLICY 
Having reviewed the broader policy context for the implementation of Cohesion policy, the 
next stage is to focus the analytical lens of this paper on the relationship between domestic 
regional policies and Cohesion policy (see Table 2 below). Whether these policies 
contribute to the same goals depends on the degree of integration or complementarity that 
exists, both strategically and spatially, between the two sets of policies.  
Table 2: Main components of domestic regional policy  
Country Domestic regional policy measures 
Austria  Economic development strategies of the Länder + federal sectoral policies 
(broad regional policy) 
Finland   Regional Development Act (2002 + subsequent revisions), National Regional 
Development Strategy 2020; Regional Cohesion and Competitiveness 
Programmes (KOKO), Centre of Expertise Programme (+ broad regional 
policy, i.e. public services, income transfers, infrastructure investments 
and taxation) 
France  Cont rat s de Proj ét s Ét at -Régions (CPER), Regional Policy Grant (PAT, Prime 
d’ aménagement  du t errit oire),  SME and small firm regional aids, Rural 
Excellence Poles, Site/Territorial Contracts, special support for Corsica and 
the Outermost Regions (+ broad regional policy, e.g. Competitiveness 
Poles, Research and Higher Education Poles) 
Germany  Regional Joint Task (Gemainschaf t saufgabe), Investment Allowance 
(Invest it ionszulage), Solidarity Pact (which funds various federal 
instruments for the Eastern Länder) (+economic development strategies of 
the individual Land governments, financial equalisation mechanism) 
Ireland No explicit regional policy, only economic development policy 
Italy   Fund for Underutilised Areas (Fondo per le Aree Sottoutilizzate, FAS) and 
the related programmes and framework programme agreements, regional 
aid schemes (+ economic development strategies of regions and national 
industrial innovation projects) 
The Netherlands  Peaks in the Delta, support to disadvantaged urban areas, low-key regional 
aids (Investment Premium, IPR) 
Poland  National Development Strategy (NDS) 2007-15 and the related domestic 
framework agreements between government and self-government 
authorities (mostly Cohesion policy co-financed), employment, investment 
and FDI grants, Special Economic Zones (SEZ) tax relief.  
Spain Inter-territorial Compensation Fund (XX) and Regional Investment Grant 
Scheme (Incent ivos regionales) 
Sweden  Regional Growth Policy (2008 Budget Bill ), Development and Regional 
Growth Programmes, various regional aid schemes (regional investment 
aid, regional grant for business development, transport grant, employment 
grant, reduction of social security contribution) and policies for different 
types of area (sparsely-populated areas (regional aids), rural (national rural 
development strategy) and urban (national strategy for regional 
development).  
United Kingdom  Until recently Grant for Business Investment (formerly Regional Selective 
Assistance), plus regional economic strategies of English regions and 
devolved administrations (economic development) 
Source: EoRPA country research. Also, EPRC and EUROREG (2010) The Object ive of  Economic and 
Social  Cohesion in t he Economic Pol icies of  Member St at es. Draf t  Final  Report  t o t he European 
Commission, Part  II:  Count ry Report s, September 2010. 
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Domestic regional policies generally include both narrow regional policy, i.e. strategies 
and interventions targeted to specific regions or territories, and broad regional policy, 
consisting of the territorial differentiation of wider policies for economic development, 
competitiveness and growth. In a few countries, notably Austria, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, narrow regional policy is not prominent, and it is predominantly the goal of 
growth and competitiveness across all regions that is pursued through domestic economic 
policy (at both national/federal and meso-level).  
As summarised in Table 3,75 domestic narrow regional policies have different goals in 
different Member States. Notwithstanding diversity in the objectives pursued, domestic 
regional policies are widely considered to be operating with a great deal of strategic 
coherence with Cohesion policy.  
Table 3: The goals of (domestic) regional policy in selected European States 
 National growth Equal living 
conditions  
Spatially balanced 
economic 
development 
Regional economic 
development 
All regions Sweden, Norway, 
Finland, France, 
Austria, 
Netherlands, 
Ireland, UK, 
Portugal, Poland 
Norway, Finland, 
Sweden 
France, Ireland, 
Sweden, Norway, 
Finland, 
Austria Portugal, 
Poland, France, UK 
Structurally 
weak 
regions 
 Norway, Sweden, 
Finland 
Germany, Spain, 
Italy 
Germany, Spain, 
Italy 
Source: Davies, S. (2006) Territ ory, Space, Geography: Where is t he Focus of  Regional  Pol icy in 
Europe?, EoRPA Paper 06/5 prepared for the 27th meeting of the EPRC Regional Research Consortium 
of EU Member States and Norway, Ross Priory, Loch Lomondside, 8-10 October 2006, EPRC, Glasgow. 
 
Two types of strategic relationship can be identified between domestic narrow regional 
policy and Cohesion policy: integration or coordination. Perhaps unsurprisingly, domestic 
and EU regional policies do not operate in totally separate frameworks in any of the 
Countries reviewed. 
The two policies are int egrated in several Member States. This is either because Cohesion 
policy has been instrumental in helping define current domestic regional policy goals (as in 
Poland and Spain), because it is largely subsumed within the domestic policy framework (as 
                                                 
75 A number of States (Germany, Spain and Italy) see the goal of domestic regional policy primarily in 
terms of assisting certain regions to overcome their structural socio-economic weaknesses, while 
others set multiple goals for regional policy.  In some countries (Austria, The Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal and the UK), regional policy has the dual goals of raising national economic growth and 
supporting economic development in all regions. In France and Ireland, the national growth goal is 
combined with the aim of achieving a more geographically balanced distribution of economic 
activities. Both of these goals are shared by other States (Norway, Finland and Sweden), but a third 
objective is added, namely to ensure equal living conditions in regions facing specific challenges.  
Davies, S. (2006) Territ ory, Space, Geography: Where is t he Focus of  Regional  Pol icy in Europe?, 
EoRPA Paper 06/5 prepared for the 27th meeting of the EPRC Regional Research Consortium of EU 
Member States and Norway, Ross Priory, Loch Lomondside, 8-10 October 2006, EPRC, Glasgow. 
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in Germany), or because of an explicit effort to merge the two policies into a coherent 
unitary framework (as in Italy and Sweden, through their NSRFs).   
In a second group of countries, the two policies are coordinat ed. Goals are either mirrored 
or matched, and there is some degree of cross-financing (Finland, France, Netherlands).  
In those countries that do not have, at present, a strong explicit regional policy - Austria, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom76 - regional development policy is largely synonymous with 
economic development policy. In these cases, Cohesion policy can be described as 
complement ary, in the sense that it is coordinated with domestic policy but focuses on a 
smaller part of the domestic economic development agenda. In these cases, Cohesion 
policy generally becomes subservient to the domestic policy streams to which it 
contributes, and it is often viewed as a useful source of top funding.  
Table 4: Relationship between domestic regional policy and Cohesion policy in selected 
countries 
Country Policy content Comment 
Austria  Complementary Coherence in terms of objectives. Implementation of 
Cohesion policy subsumed within (and co-funds) existing 
implementers of business aid and projects.  
Finland   Coordinated The two policy fields are coordinated in terms of policy cycle 
and substance. The focus of regional policy is on national 
policies.  
France  Cooordinated Cohesion policy co-funds domestic regional policy through the 
CPERs, with common strategic orientations and 
implementation systems.  
Germany  Integrated Coherence in terms of objectives. Cohesion policy has served 
to enlarge and co-fund the policies and strategies of the 
federal and Land governments. 
Ireland Complementary Cohesion policy programmes have a narrower, targeted focus, 
separated from large-scale domestic policy plans.  
Italy   Integrated Cohesion policy and domestic regional policy merged into a 
unitary regional policy through the 2007-13 National Strategic 
Document. 
Netherlands  Coordinated 
(except in the 
North, where 
integrated) 
Cohesion policy considered to be a complementary 
contribution to national policy (Peaks in the Delta), which has 
a different territorial focus. Only in the North are the two 
strands of policy merged in the Koers Noord programme. 
Poland  Integrated Most domestic policies co-funded through Cohesion policy. 
Increasing integration in terms of implementation.  
Spain Integrated Cohesion policy is channelled through domestic regional 
policy programmes.  
Sweden  Coordinated Cohesion policy represents a substantial part of financing 
regional development projects. The NSRF is the overarching 
framework for all regional policy intervention.    
United 
Kingdom  
Complementary  Coherent objectives. Implementation systems largely 
separate, but with close links.  
Sources: Bachtler J. et  al  (2009) Ex post  evaluat ion of  Cohesion pol icy programmes 2000-2006 co-
f inanced by t he ERDF (Object ive 1 and 2). Work Package 11: Management  and implementat ion 
Syst ems for Cohesion pol icy, Final  report  for t he European Commission, EPRC, Glasgow; EPRC and 
                                                 
76 The United Kingdom has had historically a strong regional policy. 
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EUROREG (2010) The Objective of Economic and Social Cohesion in the Economic Policies of Member 
States. Draft Final Report to the European Commission, Part II: Country Reports, September 2010.  
There are a number of reasons for this high degree of strategic fit between Cohesion policy 
and domestic regional policies. 
x First, in countries with considerable portions of territory covered by the 
Convergence Objective, Cohesion policy has played an important role in setting the 
agenda for domestic regional policy for the current period, and the two policies 
have become almost synonymous. In some cases, domestic regional policy has been 
subsumed within the framework of the Cohesion policy programmes (Spain, 
Poland). Further, where there is little domestic funding available (for example, 
during the economic crisis), this limits scope for autonomous domestic public 
investment priorities.  
x Second, as discussed in more detail in Section 4, Member States have increasingly 
taken steps to ensure strategic integration between EU and domestic priorities and 
spending. In previous programme periods, this was often at the level of fields of 
intervention or specific instruments, rather than at a strategic level (e.g. in 
France, Germany, Spain).77 For the preparation of the current generation of 
programmes, on the contrary, coordination has increasingly featured in Cohesion 
policy programme preparation. For instance, in the United Kingdom, policymakers 
in the devolved administrations of Scotland and Wales were able to draw on a host 
of newly developed domestic strategies during the drafting of the 2007-13 
Operational Programmes.78  
x Third, cross-financing arrangements between the two policy areas are widespread. 
For these to succeed, the two sets of policies must be strategically aligned, as two 
sources of funding must dovetail to support common projects. In a number of cases, 
Cohesion policy programmes and domestic regional policy instruments interact so 
closely that projects are passed from one to another, and domestic policy schemes 
can operate almost as a back-up or safety nets for riskier projects. One example is 
the domestically-funded additionality programme in Burgenland (Austria), which 
mirrors the Land Convergence programme. Funded from national and regional 
sources, this parallel programme allows for an interchange of projects with the 
Convergence Operational Programme. For example, lagging projects might be 
transferred from the Convergence programme to the additionality programme, so 
as not to lose resources via decommitment, and be replaced by soundly performing 
                                                 
77 Bachtler, J., Polverari, L., Orae, H., Clement, K. and Tödtling-Schönhofer, H. with Gross, F.  
McMaster, I. and Naylon, I. (2009) Ex post  evaluat ion of  Cohesion pol icy programmes 2000-2006 co-
f inanced by t he ERDF (Object ive 1 and 2). Work Package 11: Management  and implementat ion 
Syst ems for Cohesion pol icy, Final  Synt hesis Report , European Policies Research Centre and Metis, 
July 2009, p. 7. 
78 Although this has also been criticised, as it has been suggested that it may have led to political 
tensions associated with a move to a more top-down approach, with potentially less local input. See 
Campbell, J. and McSorley, L. (2008) EU regional policy after 2006: Will Scotland Notice the 
Difference? European Planning St udies 16:6, pp. 877-888. 
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projects from the additionality programme. Riskier projects are likely to be funded 
under the domestic programme only.79  
x Fourth, for the 2007-13 period, Structural Funds programmes have been developed 
to adhere closely to the priorities and goals of the Lisbon agenda. This has been 
enforced by earmarking requirements, which ensure that a high proportion of 
expenditure (at least 60 percent in Convergence regions and 75 percent in RCE 
regions) is allocated to Lisbon-type activity. At the same time, domestic policy 
has also been steered in this direction under the National Reform Programmes.  
x Last, Member States are directly involved in setting the guidelines and regulations 
that govern Cohesion policy programmes and in setting their priorities for each 
programme period. Indeed, support for efforts to use the Lisbon agenda as a 
framing device for Cohesion policy interventions in 2007-13 is partly due to the 
existing orientation of Member States domestic regional policy towards RTDI.80 
Nevertheless, some tensions between the two sets of policies can be identified. These 
relate to: (i) the spatial focus of policy; (ii) the allocation of financial envelopes; and (iii) 
management and delivery arrangements. 
The interrelationship between Cohesion policy and domestic regional policy may be 
complicated by differences in spatial coverage or territorial focus. In Italy, for instance, 
the National Strategic Document (NSD) has a territorial focus broader than that of Cohesion 
policy, in that it targets resources particularly to the development of the Mezzogiorno (a 
larger aggregate than the Convergence region eligible for Cohesion policy). This resulted in 
a complicated architecture foreseen in the NSD of Convergence National Operational 
Programmes co-funded by the Structural Funds (for the Convergence regions) and 
Mezzogiorno FAS Programmes only funded with domestic resources for the entire 
Mezzogiorno.81 In the Netherlands, the focus of domestic regional policy is on four national 
centres of potential, rather than on the less-developed north of the country.82 In both 
cases, these national choices complicated the negotiations with the Commission at 
NSRF/programme preparation stage. 
As far as financial receipts are concerned, as was illustrated in Table 1, in non-Convergence 
countries, Cohesion policy is an increasingly minor proportion of spend. For this reason, it is 
increasingly viewed as an adjunct to domestic policy and the Structural Funds and is 
increasingly subservient to these initiatives. In this situation, the domestic regional policy 
agenda is expected (by policymakers) to dominate, both in terms of content and rules and 
                                                 
79 EPRC and EUROREG (2010) The Obj ect ive of  Economic and Social  Cohesion in t he Economic Pol icies 
of  Member St at es. Draf t  Final  Report  t o t he European Commission, Part  II:  Count ry Report s, 
September 2010, pp. 4-9. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Although the latter were subsequently abolished due to cuts in FAS funding. See Polverari L (2010) 
Policies in Flux: Regional Policy Developments in Italy, 2009-2010, in in EPRC (2010) Regional Pol icy 
and Recovery f rom t he Economic Crisis: Count ry Reviews, EoRPA Paper 10/2, EPRC, Glasgow, pp. 115-
137. 
82 EPRC and Euroreg (2010) The Obj ect ive of  Economic and Social  Cohesion in t he Economic Pol icies of  
Member St at es. Draf t  Final  Report  t o t he European Commission, Part  II:  Count ry Report s, September 
2010, pp. 165-175. 
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procedures. Where it is perceived that the EU agenda dominates or subverts domestic 
spending priorities because of co-funding requirements, it can cause concern that the tail 
is wagging the dog, particularly when associated with more onerous control procedures. 
For example, in England, the Structural Funds represent only a very small part of the total 
budget of the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) (e.g. 10 percent in North East 
England). As a result, the organisational changes required within the RDAs when they 
inherited management and implementation responsibilities for the Structural Funds at the 
start of the 2007-13 period were viewed from this critical perspective.83 
Lastly, as far as policy management and delivery are concerned, where domestic regional 
policy and Cohesion policy operate in a subsumed or coordinated manner,84 the 
programming, timing and delivery of one policy area may have been adapted significantly 
to be coherent with the other. The three main areas where tensions have arisen comprise: 
(i) perceived inflexibility of one policy area in comparison with the other; (ii) additionality; 
and (iii) specific management and implementation issues.  
The perceived inflexibility of one policy area (usually Cohesion policy) in comparison with 
the other was a frequently cited issue during the EoRPA research. Riskier projects may be 
routed to receive support from domestic sources instead. As previously mentioned, in 
Burgenland (Austria), two parallel programmes (one Cohesion policy, and one domestic) are 
used to interchange projects, with the less risky and more soundly performing ones being 
transferred to the Cohesion policy programme. Similarly, in the Netherlands, a number of 
separate, but similar, policy programmes were implemented in addition to the Structural 
Funds rather than being added to the Operational Programme budgets as co-funding, due to 
the control pressures experienced under the Cohesion policy programmes.  
Additionality is one of the basic principles of Cohesion policy, but compliance with this 
requirement appears problematic, both in countries with significant proportions of 
Convergence funding and in countries where Cohesion policy receipts (under the RCE 
Objective) are marginal. In the former case, evidence from past studies suggests that 
despite the requirement of the additionality principle, funding from Cohesion policy can 
lead to crowding-out of national expenditure.85 A study by Ederveen et  al  estimated that in 
Objective 1 (now Convergence) areas, a region typically forgoes 50% of national regional 
aid once it becomes eligible for Objective 1 support. This boils down to an average 
                                                 
83 Vironen, H. (2008) Getting underway  The first phase of implementing the 2007-2013 programmes. 
Review of Programme Developments: Autumn 2007  Spring 2008, IQ-Net  Review Paper No. 22(1), 
EPRC, Glasgow.   
84 Taylor, S., Bachtler, J. and Rooney, M. L. (2000) Implementing the New Generation of Structural 
Funds Programmes: Project Development, Appraisal and Selection, IQ-Net  Themat ic Paper, 7(2), 
2000, EPRC, Glasgow. See also Ferry, M., Gross, F., Bachtler, J. and McMaster, I. (2007) Turning 
Strategies into Projects: The Implementation of 2007-13 Structural Funds Programmes, IQ-Net  Paper 
20(2), 2007, EPRC, Glasgow.  
85 Wostner, P. and lander, S. (2009) The effectiveness of EU Cohesion Policy Revisited: Are EU Funds 
really additional?, European Pol icy Research Paper, 69, EPRC, Glasgow.  
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crowding out of 0.17 of cohesion support per 1 of cohesion policy.86 In RCE regions, the 
institutional relationship between Cohesion policy and domestic regional policy can 
exacerbate the difficulties of ensuring that Cohesion policy funds are truly additional. For 
instance, questions have been raised in Ireland about how best to ensure the additionality 
of the funds, given the reduced levels of Cohesion policy funding and Irelands centralised 
system for the disbursal of funding. As EU funds have declined, questions have been raised 
about the visibility of EU-funded operations, as some argue they are becoming lost among 
the exchequer-funded activities administered by the same departments and agencies.87   
Additionality is more difficult to ensure at a time when domestic public sector budgets are 
increasingly under pressure. The Italian 2009 Strategic Report mentions a loss of 
additionality of c. 15 percent compared to the level established ex ante, due largely to the 
cuts and reallocations of the FAS fund and to the deteriorating macro-economic context.88 
In this light, questions have been raised about the most appropriate method that should be 
used to verify compliance, for instance whether to link the calculation of domestic co-
financed resources to GDP (so as to automatically discount cyclical fluctuations). 89   
Lastly, tensions in approaches to management and implementation have also been 
mentioned with regard to specific aspects of management and implementation. 
x Problems have arisen where domestic regional policy programmes and Cohesion 
policy programmes run according to different timetables. For example, in England, 
the RDA Single Programme operated on a financial year (April-April), while the 
ERDF programmes operate on a calendar-year basis. This increases complexity when 
trying to meet spending targets, as the domestic regional policy resources are the 
major source of co-funding.  
x Although regional policy may be closely integrated with Cohesion policy at strategy 
level (through the NSRF), they are sometimes separated in implementation. In 
Sweden, for example, even when Regional Growth and Cohesion policies work 
closely together during programme development phases, implementation is often 
problematic. Also, while cross-sectoral coordination and working practices are 
considered to perform well, particularly in the northern regions that are used to 
working together, it sometimes becomes a difficult issue in newly created regions 
(i.e. in the context of the Competitiveness and Employment Objective, which now 
covers the entire country).  
                                                 
86 Ederveen, S., Gorter, J., De Mooij, R. and Nahuis, R. (2003) Funds and Games. The Economics of 
European Cohesion Policy, ENEPRI (European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes) 
Occasional Paper, 3, October 2003, p. 41. 
87 Moylan, K. (2009) The Fut ure of  EU Cohesion Pol icy and it s Impl icat ions for Ir ish Regional Pol icy,  
Paper presented at the Regional Science Association International Conference, Limerick, Ireland 3 
September 2009, p. 6.  
88 Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Dipartimento per lo Sviluppo e la Coesione Economica, 
Rapport o St rat egico Nazionale 2009, December 2009, p. 24. 
89 See also: CSIL (2010) Impact  of  Addit ional it y on t he Real Economy of  t he EU Member St at es: Open 
quest ions, some fact s and a review of  t he l i t erat ure, Final  Report  t o DG Regional Pol icy. 
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Overall, however, the main problem that affects the relationship between Cohesion policy 
and domestic policies as far as implementation is concerned relates to the perceived lack 
of proportionality of Cohesion policy implementation arrangements, which is exacerbated 
by their lack of coherence with domestic administrative procedures (for instance, in the 
field of audits).90 Cohesion policy is often perceived to place undue emphasis on formal 
compliance, and this contrasts with efforts made domestically to increase results-
orientated policy delivery. The formalistic approach adopted by DG Regio to approving the 
management and control systems are particularly indicative of this contradiction.  
                                                 
90 Davies, S., Gross, F. and Polverari, F. (2008) The Financial Management, Control and Audit of EU 
Cohesion Policy: Contrasting Views on Challenges, Idiosyncrasies and the Way Ahead, IQ-Net  
Themat ic Paper 23(2), EPRC, Glasgow. 
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4. COORDINATION INITIATIVES AND FRAMEWORKS 
As discussed above, there is a great deal of coordination between domestic regional policy 
and Cohesion policy. In some cases, this goes beyond regional policy to encompass the 
wider set of policy areas. EoRPA country research has highlighted the different measures 
and mechanisms that Member States use to secure coordination between different policies. 
These are both institutional and strategic in nature. 
x The institutional measures include: (i) the coordination of different policies via 
either long-standing institutional arrangements (as in Austria, Germany and 
France) or recent government reforms (as in Finland and Sweden); (ii) the 
targeting of increased cross-sectoral integration at the regional level with a 
reorganisation of functions at this level (in Finland);, and (iii) the achievement of 
increased integration between domestic and EU co-funded regional policy through 
increased operational integration at the level of policy instruments (in France).  
x The strategic measures comprise: (i) the coordination of domestic and EU-co-
funded regional policies at national level through the NSRF (for instance in Sweden 
and Italy); (ii) the integration of the regional dimension in sectoral policies through 
the spatial planning process (notably in Poland, Austria and Wales); and (iii) the 
coordination of regional policy with wider economic development policies at the 
regional level (as in England, Italy, Finland, Spain and Sweden). 
4.1 Institutional coordination arrangements   
The ÖROK (Austrian Conference on Spatial Planning) is perhaps the classic example of a 
long-standing institutional arrangement supporting multi-level, cross-sectoral coordination 
(for regional policy). As the traditional arena for vertical coordination between the Bund, 
the Länder and the Austrian municipalities, it has also increasingly become an arena for 
cross-sectoral coordination, not least through the ongoing STRAT.ATplus information and 
exchange process, linked to the Austrian NSRF (STRAT.AT, which was drafted by ÖROK). 
A similar long-standing coordination within the field of regional policy  i.e. between 
domestic and EU co-funded regional policy - exists in Germany, through the Regional Joint 
Task political committee and technical sub-committee, which are made up of federal and 
Land representatives, and the Conference of Regional Ministers 
(Regionalminist erkonferenz). Cross-sectoral coordination with other policies is also 
organised through the various plans and strategies of federal, Land and local governments.  
 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 78  European Policies Research Centre 29
Complementarity or conflict? The (in)coherence of Cohesion policy 
Box 2: ÖROK and STRAT.ATplus 
Founded in 1971, ÖROK manages a network of all relevant federal and regional bodies involved 
in regional policy, regional development and spatial planning, both in the domestic and EU 
contexts. ÖROK was set up as a joint initiative by the federal and Land levels together with the 
Austrian municipalities as a compromise solution to coordination, because attempts to create 
more traditional models for coordination between the federal and Land levels (e.g. a federal-
level framework) had failed.  
In broad terms, the tasks of ÖROK include the coordination of policy design and facilitation of 
discussions on spatial matters between the federal level (e.g. sectoral ministries) and the 
Länder. The tasks are set out in the bodys governing rules of procedures, but there are also 
annual or multi-annual work programmes (Arbeit sprogramme) for additional tasks. For instance, 
the medium-term work programme for 2006-2008 focused on the development of spatial 
scenarios for Austria for 2030. In addition, ÖROK publishes a variety of documents in a special 
publications series (the ÖROK Schrif t enreihe), reports on spatial planning 
(Raumordnungsbericht e), recommendations (Empfehlungen), and an ÖROK Atlas on spatial 
development in Austria. 
Following Austrias accession to the EU in 1995, ÖROK started to play an increasingly important 
role in the context of the Cohesion policy. While its functions were limited to technical aspects 
in the first two programme periods (e.g. providing a secretariat for the Monitoring Committee), 
it adopted a more significant role in the 2007-13 period, particularly through its involvement in 
the drafting of the NSRF (STRAT.AT).  
The development of the NSRF, through a consultative process named STRAT.AT, was perceived 
to have been so useful with respect to the coordination of different actors and policies, that it 
was continued in the new programme period. The STRAT.ATplus comprises two series of events 
of information and exchange, 'Foren' organised by ÖROK and 'St rat egien' organised by others, 
mainly the Federal Chancellery and the nine Länder. STRAT.ATplus events have covered a 
variety of themes on Cohesion policy and beyond (e.g. the launch of the Structural Funds period 
2007-13; 12 years of Structural Funds in Austria; Seventh Framework Programme; EU Cohesion 
Policy 2014+; Governance of regional development). STRAT.ATplus activities are based on 
annual programmes, and the year 2009 focused on trends and challenges, such as the 
Commissions Regions 2020 report on demography, climate change, energy and globalisation.  
Although the STRAT.ATplus provides an interesting example of cooperation and exchange of 
information, it does not have any formalised structure or any clear membership basis. Instead, 
the events are targeted at all kinds of bodies and individuals involved in (EU) Cohesion policy 
and (domestic) regional policy. ÖROKs strategic support of Cohesion policy (mainly the 
STRAT.ATplus process) has also been recognised by the Commission. 
Lastly in France, cross-sectoral coordination at the national level  i.e. between Cohesion 
and domestic regional policy, and between these and wider domestic policies  is also a 
long-standing feature of public policy and is achieved through the work carried out by 
DATAR, which is in charge of coordinating both policy preparation (including budgetary 
aspects) and policy implementation across all ministries concerned by regional development 
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issues. Given the breadth of themes within French regional policy, the inter-ministerial 
approach, which is mainly in place for the CPERs (Cont rat s de proj et s Et at -régions, the 
main regional policy intervention tool in France), is used for a considerable range of 
initiatives (e.g. regional aid grant, rural excellence poles, clusters, national territorial 
renewal fund). In this context, the fact that, since 1988, DATAR has also been responsible 
for Cohesion policy has enhanced its coordination with domestic regional policy, and the 
two are now considerably aligned. The cross-sectoral coordination filters down from the 
national to the regional levels through the work of regional state representatives (the 
préfet s). At a more operational level, the coordination between domestic regional policy 
and Cohesion policy has been pursued through the operational alignment of the domestic 
CPERs (Cont rat s de proj ect  Et at -région, the main regional policy intervention tool in 
France) and the ERDF co-funded OPs.  The CPERs have wider priorities than ERDF in France 
(as they include, for example, rail and public transport), and coordinated governance, 
including a coordinated decision-making process, was introduced to address implementation 
difficulties which had occurred in the late 1990s. This includes: common strategic 
orientations focused on the Lisbon and Gothenburg agendas; shared regional diagnoses 
leading to coherent intervention strategies; shared intervention fields based on innovation, 
research, ICT, employment/training, support to industries, sustainable development and 
energy, territorial development and interregional policies; and common timescales and 
management, monitoring and evaluation systems.  
Turning now to more recent developments, a reorganisation of government structures to 
increase coordination between Cohesion policy and domestic policies (regional policy and 
beyond) has been introduced in Finland, where increased coordination has been obtained 
through the reorganisation of regional development competencies in a new Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy, established at the start of 2008. This now includes the units 
responsible for regional development from the Ministries of Trade and Industry, Labour and 
the Interior.  Despite the fact that under the Regional Development Act, most sectoral 
ministries91 are responsible for drafting their own regional development strategies 
(indicating  regional development goals, regional focus of measures and regional spend), 
and that the regional councils take into consideration the governments regional 
development objectives in their regional strategic programmes, regional policy coordination 
has been a challenge due to the number of actors involved in regional development. The 
national reorganisation has been successful in improving cross-sectoral coordination, and 
this is being supplemented by an ad hoc project launched in 2010, which should also 
increase cross-sectoral coordination at the level of individual regions and enhance multi-
level coordination (the ALKU project, see Box 3). 
                                                 
91 Ten ministries are covered by these provisions: Employment and the Economy; Transport and 
Communications; Agriculture and Forestry; Justice; Education; Defence; the Interior; Social Affairs 
and Health; Finance; and the Environment.  To date, only five have produced regional strategies: 
Employment and the Economy; Agriculture and Forestry; Finance; Social Affairs and Health; and the 
Environment. In other ministries, objectives related to regional development are included in their 
respective sectoral strategies. 
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Box 3: Regional-level cross-sectoral coordination in Finland: the ALKU project 
The ALKU project introduced at the start of 2010 is expected to be a key development in 
improving sectoral coordination at the regional level in Finland. Essentially a reform of the 
States regional administrative structure, the project aims to strengthen the regional 
development system and to clarify the role of regional development in the decision-making 
processes of the government and different sectoral ministries. In addition, the reform has 
provided conditions for the regional councils to influence the steering of the States regional 
resources in the regions, as well as to coordinate the various development measures of the State 
and the municipalities.  
One of the key changes introduced by the ALKU project concerns the reduction of authorities 
responsible for regional development from six to two. The new authorities include the agencies 
for regional administration (AVIs)92  and the centres for business, traffic and environment 
(ELYs)93, both of which will work in collaboration with the regional councils. The new structure 
is clearer and expected to facilitate the focusing of resources on regionally approved priorities. 
In addition, a new committee for regional and structural policy was established in March 2010 to 
replace the formerly separate regional development negotiation committee and Structural Funds 
negotiation committee. The new committee will: process proposals relating to national regional 
development objectives and to other significant regional development plans and programmes; 
support the Ministry of Employment and the Economy in its coordination and monitoring tasks; 
coordinate sectoral regional development strategies and their objectives; monitor the 
implementation of national regional development objectives and sectoral regional development 
strategies, and the related steering of the States regional administration; and make suggestions 
for the coordination and development of national regional development and Structural Funds 
activities.   
Source: EoRPA country research. 
4.2 Strategic measures 
Cross-policy coordination is ensured also through overarching policy frameworks at both 
national and regional levels. At the national levels, the NSRFs have been a useful tool in 
this respect, for example in Sweden and Italy. In Sweden, the NSRF provides the overall 
framework for sectoral coordination between regional growth policy, labour market policy 
and Cohesion policy. As well as being the overarching framework for the implementation of 
Structural Funds, it also provides the basis for domestic regional policy programmes 
(Regional Development and Regional Growth programmes). The Swedish NSRF for 2007-13 
has therefore provided the main strategy for the implementation of regional growth 
activities too. This increased strategic integration between different policies was achieved 
                                                 
92 A total of six AVI agencies were created, which perform tasks related to basic services, legal 
protection, police and rescue operations, environmental permissions and employment protection.  
93 The ELY centres cover tasks related to economy, labour force, expertise, culture, traffic and 
infrastructure, as well as environment and natural resources. However, only nine of the ELY centres 
perform functions related to the above-mentioned fields, while the six other centres are more 
concentrated in their tasks.  
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through ad hoc work for this purpose undertaken during the preparation of the NSRF, as 
illustrated in Box 4.  
The OECD has recently endorsed the development of Swedish regional growth policy in 
terms of stronger linkages and coordination between other sectoral policy areas, and also in 
terms of stronger coordination between the actors at different levels,94 in recognition of 
the fact that regional growth is achieved by a number of different programmes and 
measures, some of which take place outside the regional growth policy framework (such as 
infrastructure, education and services), as has already been noted. 
Box 4: Cross-sectoral coordination in the preparation of the Swedish NSRF 
In Sweden, since 2007, efforts have been made to increase cross-sectoral cooperation at 
national, regional and local levels. In 2007, the Swedish Government assigned 20 authorities and 
organisations to enhance cross-sectoral cooperation in the context of sustainable regional 
growth. The assignment divided the authorities into three groups according to NSRF priorities: 
innovation and renewal, competence development and increased labour force supply, and 
accessibility. The aim was to contribute to cross-sectoral working methods and more 
coordinated cooperation with local and regional actors. By 2009, this was perceived to have 
resulted in increased knowledge amongst national authorities on each others activities and 
roles, as well as on the objectives and priorities of regional actors. It was concluded that 
understanding on regional growth issues had risen, as had the importance of regional growth 
within their respective areas of expertise. However, the results also pointed out that some 
authorities found it difficult to develop an overview of regional growth questions, and that 
cooperative processes took time to develop. Many authorities were also looking for clearer 
direction from government, and other measures (for instance, more resources) were also 
considered to be important in terms of promoting cooperation. Lastly, it was noted that the 
level of interest in cooperation was largely linked to previous experiences, but that it was also 
linked to the extent to which cooperation was seen to contribute to the authorities own core 
activities.95   
 
In similar vein, the Italian 2007-13 NSRF (known as the National Strategic Document, NSD) 
brings both strands of regional policy  EU co-financed and other  under a single umbrella, 
merging the two into a unified regional policy. The aim is to achieve increased coherence 
and complementarity between the two strands of policy and allow for joint monitoring and 
evaluation. This unitary nature of regional policy is also pursued at the regional level with 
joint evaluation plans. However, the unitary framework has come under threat with the 
                                                 
94 Regeringens skrivelse, St rat egiskt  t i l lväxt arbet e för regional  konkurrenskraf t ,  ent reprenörskap och 
sysselsät t ning, 2009/10:221, 27 May 2010, p. 14. 
95 Näringsdepartementet (2009) ’ St rat egisk uppföl j ning av en nat ionel l  st rat egi för regional  
konkurrenskraf t ,  ent reprenörskap och sysselsät t ning 2007–2013, pp. 50-51. 
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cuts in 2009 to the domestic regional policy budget and the consequent suppression of some 
NSD investment programmes.96  
The spatial planning process is another increasingly important arena for cross-policy 
planning. In Poland, for instance, the new draft National Spatial Policy Concept (KPZK) 
produced in 2010 will bring spatial and regional policy issues together for the first time 
under the overall heading of strategic development. The previous National Spatial Policy 
Concept did not contain any reference to national regional development strategies or 
objectives or to region-specific strategies,97 and as Polands new regional policy model has 
developed new categorisations of the national territory, this lack of integration created 
potential challenges and tensions, for instance in terms of transport or housing provision at 
different levels. The approach taken in the new draft KPZK focuses on networking Polands 
largest metropolitan areas to create an open system connected to other metropolitan 
centres in Europe. This reflects the polarisation-diffusion model outlined in the latest 
draft of the Polish National Strategy for Regional Development. The classification of 
functional areas in the KPZK also accords with the place-based approach noted in 
Polands new regional policy model, confirming the increased attention being given to 
identifying the resources and needs of different territories.  
A similar approach of coordination through spatial planning can be found in Austria and in 
Wales. In Austria, the Austrian spatial planning strategy (Austrian Spatial Development 
Concept, Österreichisches Raument wicklungskonzept , ÖREK) provides the basis for federal 
regional policy, ensuring that it is coordinated with other federal policies with spatial 
impact and with those implemented in the Länder.98 In Wales, the Welsh Spatial Plan 
provides a forum for cross-sectoral coordination through the operation of regional cross-
sectoral groups. In addition, a Policy Gateway Integration Tool is intended to increase 
cross-sectoral coordination by facilitating assessment of the impact of policies (including 
Cohesion policy) on all government priorities, and attempting to ensure that all policies 
take due account of each other and are sustainable.99   
Cross-sectoral coordination is also achieved by coordinating (or subsuming) Cohesion policy 
initiatives under economic development strategies at the regional level. For example, in 
the English regions, the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) receive their budgets from a 
range of different sectoral government departments, which then goes into a single pot, to 
be coordinated and spent at regional level according to the agreed Regional Economic 
                                                 
96 See Polverari L (2010) Policies in Flux: Regional Policy Developments in Italy, 2009-2010, in in EPRC 
(2010) Regional Pol icy and Recovery f rom t he Economic Crisis: Count ry Reviews, EoRPA Paper 10/2, 
EPRC, Glasgow, pp. 115-137. 
97 Szlachta, J. and Zaucha, J. (2010) A new paradigm of EU regional development in the context of 
Polands National Spatial Development Concept in Churski, P. and Ratajczak, W. (eds.) (2010) 
Regional  development  and regional  pol icy in Poland: f irst  experiences and new chal lenges of  t he 
European Union membership, PAN: Warsaw, p. 165. 
98 It is currently under revision (the current ÖREK from 2001 is its fourth edition and the approval of 
the revised version is foreseen for 2011). It is a guidance document addressing relevant stakeholders 
and policymakers in spatial and regional development, although it has no legally binding character. 
99 WAG (2009) Territ orial  Cohesion: The View f rom Wales. The Response of  t he Welsh Assembly 
Government  t o t he European Commission's Consult at ion on Territ orial  Cohesion. 
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Strategy, which acts as an umbrella framework, helping to ensure coordination.100 
Somewhat similarly, in Sweden, Regional Development Programmes are in place to provide 
an overarching framework for longer-term holistic strategies in the regions, facilitating 
coordination across sectors and between local, regional and national initiatives, and 
establishing a basis for other programmes and instruments implemented in the region. A 
similar integrative function is fulfilled by the Regional Development Plans of the Italian and 
Spanish regions and by the regional strategies of Finnish regions (in all cases broader socio-
economic development strategies). 
Having reviewed these many mechanisms, a fundamental question emerges as to whether, 
in these attempts at cross-sectoral coordination, Cohesion policy informs domestic policies 
or whether domestic policies, even when they do not pursue the same underlying objectives 
of Cohesion policy, dictate the agenda of Cohesion policy programmes.101 The question is 
perhaps largely academic nowadays given the alignment of Cohesion policy with the Lisbon 
agenda - the Lisbon orientation of the Member States own policies should deliver a 
natural policy convergence. Whether this convergence is in agreement with the primary 
goal of Cohesion policy of regional catching-up is open to question, however (and is largely 
beyond the remit of the paper, and consequently discussed only briefly in Section 6.1). 
                                                 
100 Shutt J., Colwell A. and Koutsoukos S. (2002) Structural Funds and their impact: Signed and 
sealed, but can we deliver? European Planning St udies, 10, 1, pp.113-130. 
101 For instance, one of the fieldwork interviews conducted highlighted that due to the small budgets 
Cohesion policy cannot be expected to change or correct the rationales of domestic policies which 
have important spatial impacts. 
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5. ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS 
AND PUBLIC SECTOR EFFICIENCY 
The external coherence of Cohesion policy relates not only to the degree of strategic fit 
and consistency between this policy with other policies, including - where existing -
domestic regional policy, but also to the institutional context and public administration 
systems of a given country. Cohesion policy does not operate in a vacuum: it is managed, 
implemented and delivered by the public administration of Member States and regions. The 
degree of institutional capacities available - at both these levels, at sub-regional levels and 
amongst partners and beneficiaries - is thus paramount to ensure effective and efficient 
policy delivery. Research carried out in the showed that effective implementation of 
Cohesion policy is conditional upon a good institutional structure,102 that Cohesion policy 
is more efficiently implemented where institutional capacities are high,103 and that 
political stability affects the policys ability to deliver the intended goals, as it encourages 
the pursuit of long-term (rather than short-term, discretional) development policies and 
strengthens administrative continuity and efficiency.104 There is thus a paradox that 
regions with stronger institutional capacity make the most effective use of Structural 
Funds, even though it could be argued that they need them least.105  
All the countries covered by this paper are considered to have a degree of administrative 
capacity that is at least sufficient to ensure that policy is delivered to specification. In most 
of the countries reviewed, administrative capacity at all levels concerned by Cohesion 
policy is considered to be high. The Spanish NSRF, for example, explicitly states that there 
are no difficulties with institutional capacity in the regions or at national level and, for this 
reason, it does not include a priority or specific interventions to this purpose. In some 
cases, however, there are unresolved issues. In Italy and Poland, in particular, areas of the 
public administration are considered in need of strengthening and Cohesion policy funding 
is utilised for this purpose.   
In Italy, previous CSFs for the Southern regions have made unprecedented efforts to 
strengthen the capacities of regional administrations in these areas, particularly in the 
fields of programming, monitoring and evaluation. Improvements were indeed achieved and 
                                                 
102 Ederveen, S., de Groot, H. L. and Nahuis, R. (2006) Fertile Soil for Structural Funds? A Panel Data 
Analysis of the Conditional Effectiveness of European Cohesion policy, Kyklos, 59, pp. 7-42. In their 
analysis they consider three types of institutional quality variables: variables related directly to the 
outcomes of government policy (inflation and government savings); variables that indicate social 
cohesion (trust); variables on institutional quality (corruption perception index, openness and quality 
of governance index). They find that the last set of variables significantly affects the capability of 
Cohesion policy to determine growth/catching-up. 
103 Milio, S. (2007) Can Administrative Capacity Explain Differences in Regional Performances? 
Evidence from Structural Funds Implementation in Southern Italy, Regional St udies, 41, 4, pp. 429-
442. 
104 Milio, S. (2010) Twenty years of European funding. Italy is still struggling with implementation, in  
Mammone, A. and Veltri, G. A. (eds.)(2010) It aly t he Sick Man of  Europe,  Routledge, London, pp. 
213-228; Milio, S. (2008) op. cit .; Iona, A., Leonida, L. and Sobbrio, G. (2010) Industrialisation, 
convergence and governance, in Mammone, A, and Veltri, G. A. (2010) op. cit ., pp. 201-212. 
105 Begg, I. (2008) op. cit ., pp. 291-310.  
Complementarity or conflict? The (in)coherence of Cohesion policy 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 78  European Policies Research Centre 38
Cohesion policy has also been considered to have introduced important innovations and 
spillover effects into domestic practices.106 However, it is acknowledged that such progress 
was uneven across regions107 and that further improvements are needed. For instance, a 
persistent problem, which applies to the whole of Italy but is particularly marked in the 
Mezzogiorno, is the long timetable of infrastructure investments.108 Furthermore, it is 
becoming increasingly apparent that progress achieved thus far may not be irreversible, 
which underlines the importance of continued investments in this sphere. The current NSRF 
thus devotes a considerable amount of resources to strengthening the institutional and 
technical-administrative capacities of the public administrations.109 This is not without 
challenges, however, as the recent Strategic Report noted that a considerable proportion of 
these resources is being used for the acquisition of typical TA services, rather than those 
broad interventions which are able to ensure the overcoming, in a definitive and 
permanent way, of the structural gap, in particular, of the Public Administration of the 
Mezzogiorno.110  
Poland, on the other hand, has displayed the problems that are typical of Member States 
that have only more recently joined the European Union:111  
x a public administration that is struggling to adapt to the requirements of Cohesion 
policy, that are both extraneous to the previous administrative tradition of the 
country and very resource-intensive (which led the administrations in charge of 
2004-06 programmes to prioritise short-term contingency measures over longer-
term strategic approaches);112  
 
x a central-regional cleavage between the national government, reluctant to pass on 
responsibilities to the regions, and the regions that are striving for more powers 
                                                 
106 Fargion, V., Morlino, L. and Profeti, S. (2006) Europeizzazione e rappresent anza t errit oriale. Il  
caso it al iano (Il Mulino, Bologna). 
107 See Milio, S. (2007 and 2008) op. cit . 
108 Mancurti, A. (2010) Test imonianza al l ’ indagine conoscit iva Commissione V Bilancio, Tesoro e 
Programmazione, resocont o st enograf ico, seduta di mercoledì 27 gennaio 2010, 11. As observed by 
Mancurti, this is not a problem that the ministry in charge of Cohesion and domestic regional policy 
can solve, but which is crucial given the 11 years needed on average for such projects (which 
contrasts with the 8-year timetable of Cohesion policy). See also Bentivogli, C., Casadio, P. and 
Cullino, R. (2010) I problemi nella realizzazione delle opere pubbliche: le differenze territoriali, in 
Cannari, L. (ed.) op. cit ., pp. 223-252.  
109 Priority 10 of the NSD Governance, institutional capacities and effective competitive markets. 
This priority includes 2.1 billion, equivalent to 3.6 percent of the total Cohesion policy programming 
for 2007-13, of which 1.7 billion for Convergence regions and 0.4 billion for the remaining regions. 
110 Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Dipartimento per lo Sviluppo e la Coesione Economica, 
Rapport o St rat egico Nazionale 2009, Rome, December 2009, p. 43 (own translation). 
111 Bachtler, J. et  al  (2009) op. cit . See also European Commission (2010) Communicat ion f rom t he 
Commission t o t he European Parl iament , t he Council ,  t he European Economic and Social  Commit t ee 
and t he Commit t ee of  t he Regions, Cohesion pol icy: St rat egic Report  2010 on t he implementat ion of  
t he programmes 2007-2013, SEC(2010)360, COM(2010)110 final, Brussels, 31.3.2010. 
112 Kozak, M., Ledzion, B., Olejniczak, K., Weremiuk, A. and Woitowicz, D. (2009) Ex post  evaluat ion 
of  Cohesion pol icy programmes 2000-2006 co-f inanced by t he ERDF. Work Package 11: Management  
and Implement at ion syst ems for Cohesion pol icy. Final  Report .  Task 2 – Nat ional  Assessment  Report  
Poland, European Policies Research Centre and Metis, July 2009. 
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(e.g. concerning the use of integrated or Regional Operational Programmes, the 
role of central government offices in the regions, or the use of stringent guidelines 
by the Ministry of Regional Development to inform the management of Regional 
Operational Programmes);  
 
x the typical exodus from the public sector, in favour of better-paid private sector 
jobs; and  
x problems linked to high staff turnover.  
As in Italy, the Polish NSRF provides a response to these needs, with interventions to 
strengthen the strategic dimension of regional policy, improve the quality of public policy 
management, and strengthen multi-level coordination and support of social capital in the 
regions.113 
Table 5: Administrative capacity for regional policy implementation 
Country Territorial 
disparities in 
administrative 
capacity level 
Adequacy of 
administrative 
capacity 
Reported problems? 
Austria No Yes  None 
Finland No Yes None 
France No Yes High staff turnover 
Central/regional cleavage  
Germany No Yes None 
Ireland No Yes State/region cleavage 
Italy Yes Improvements 
needed 
PA in Southern regions 
Long infrastructure projects timetable 
Political instability in some regions 
The Netherlands No Yes  None 
Poland No Improvements 
needed 
Significant expansion of PA capacity 
since accession, but:  
- high staff turnover 
- private sector crowding-out  
- state/region cleavage 
Spain No Yes None 
Sweden No Yes  None 
United Kingdom No No Potential problem of abolition of RDAs 
in England 
Source: EoRPA country research. 
                                                 
113 And as in Italy, learning made through Cohesion policy implementation has been deemed to have 
spilled over into domestic practices. See DĎbrovski, M. (2008) Structural Funds as a Driver for 
Institutional Change in Poland, Europe-Asia St udies, 60, 2, pp. 227-248, and Kozak, M. et  al  (2009), 
op. cit .  
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A similar national/regional cleavage as in Poland has been observed in Ireland and France. 
In the latter, an additional problem is the high staff turnover within State services at all 
levels, which is encouraged by an increasing use of shorter-term contracts for civil servants 
and career paths for senior civil servants that reward task rotation. This feature, which 
applies to the French State administration across the board, is considered to be particularly 
problematic for Cohesion policy, given the considerable level of technicality of the tasks 
involved in administering co-financed programmes and the time needed to build adequate 
expertise in this area. 
In other cases, the delivery of Cohesion policy has not been hindered by insufficient 
domestic administrative capacities per se, but instead by the introduction of domestic 
administrative reorganisation. In England, in particular, the change in management and 
implementation arrangements for ERDF in 2007-13 - where delegated Managing Authority 
responsibility was transferred from the regional Government Offices to the Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) - led to capacity problems with regard to closure of the 2000-
06 programmes.114 The recently-announced abolition of the RDAs may present further 
challenges regarding the delivery of the current programmes. 
The preparatory research for this paper focused in particular on whether there are 
disparities in the levels of administrative capacity across the national territory and the 
extent to which these, insofar as they exist, hamper regional catching-up and growth. This 
issue has emerged as particularly problematic in only one of the countries reviewed - Italy - 
where the duality in the socio-economic situation between South and Centre-North is also 
reflected in an equal lower level of institutional endowment (Table 5). Various studies 
testify to the lower administrative efficiency and quality of essential public services of the 
Italian Mezzogiorno compared to the national average.115 Giordano et  al, for example, have 
rated public sector efficiency in four public services (education, healthcare, justice and 
nurseries) across the Italian territory, concluding that the South of Italy features at the 
bottom in the ranking of efficiency across all four services and across all measures 
considered, and that the gap in performance is particularly acute in those services that are 
managed at local level.116 Sociologic explanations for this duality point to the lower level of 
                                                 
114 And indeed, although a tangential topic for this paper, it should be mentioned that the difficulties 
caused by managing the complexity of overlapping programme periods was raised as a common 
problem in the 2009 Strategic Reports of a number of countries. See European Commission (2010) 
Cohesion Pol icy: St rat egic Report  2010 on t he implement at ion of  t he programmes 2007-20103. 
Communicat ion f rom t he Commission t o t he European Parl iament , The Council ,  The European 
Economic and Social  Commit t ee and t he Commit t ee for t he regions, SEC (2010)360/COM (2010)110 
final, Brussels 31.03.2010. 
115 Cannari, L. and Franco, D. (2009) Presentazione delle ricerche, in Cannari, L. (ed.) op. cit ., pp. 
7-12.   
116 Giordano, R., Tommasino, P. and Casiraghi, M. (2009) Le determinanti dellefficienza del settore 
pubblico: il ruolo delle cultura e delle istituzioni, in Cannari, L. (ed.) op. cit ., pp. 253-278. Similar 
results have been delivered by studies on territorial performance of civil tribunals and on the 
territorial performance of public administrations based on IT-based services provided and accounting 
transparency. See Carmignani, A. and Giacomelli, S. (2009) La giustizia civile in Italia: i divari 
territoriali, in Cannari, L. (ed.) op. cit ., pp. 325-352; SVIMEZ (2008) Rapport o SVIMEZ 2008 
sul l ’ economia del  Mezzogiorno, Il Mulino, Bologna 2008; SVIMEZ (2009) Rapport o SVIMEZ 2009 
sul l ’ economia del  Mezzogiorno, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2009; Sapienza, R. (2009) op. cit . ;  Arpaia, C., 
Daronzo, R. and Ferro, P. (2009) Informatizzazione, trasparenza contabile e competitività della 
pubblica amministrazione: unanalisi a livello regionale, in Cannari, L. (ed.) op. cit ., pp. 353-381. 
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social capital in the Southern regions compared to the rest of Italy,117 which includes a 
lesser degree of trust by citizens in public institutions, lower levels of expectation and a 
minimal participation in political life and so forth, all of which feed a vicious circle of 
furthering disenfranchisement and lessening social capital.118 Nevertheless, there must be 
other factors at stake too, not just because the lower social capital can be seen as a 
consequence rather than a cause of the lower institutional endowment, but because of the 
considerable efforts realised in subsequent programme periods (particularly in the 2000-06 
CSF and in the current NSD) to raise such social capital (though it is acknowledged that 
their effects are by nature visible only in the longer-term).  
                                                                                                                                            
See also Franco, D. (2010) LEconomia del Mezzogiorno in Cannari, L. and Franco, D. (eds.) Il  
Mezzogiorno e la pol it ica economica del l ’ It al ia, Banca dItalia, Seminari e convegni, n. 4, giugno 
2010, pp. 1-13. 
117 Putnam, R. D., Nanetti, R. and Leonardi, R. (1993) Making democracy work: civic t radit ions in 
modern It aly, Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J.   
118 Putnam, R. D. et  al  (1993) op. cit .; Giordano, R. et  al  (2009) op. cit . 
Complementarity or conflict? The (in)coherence of Cohesion policy 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 78  European Policies Research Centre 42
Complementarity or conflict? The (in)coherence of Cohesion policy 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 78  European Policies Research Centre 43
6. THE INTERNAL COHERENCE OF COHESION POLICY 
As emphasised in previous sections of this paper, the external coherence of Cohesion 
policy, i.e. its consistency with domestic policies and institutional frameworks, may be an 
important (and under-analysed) factor contributing to the ability of this policy to attain its 
stated goals of regional catching-up (in Convergence areas) and growth and employment (in 
RCE regions). Much more frequently discussed in the academic and policy literatures is the 
internal coherence of Cohesion policy, i.e. its internal functioning and whether some 
features of the current Cohesion policy regulatory framework may hinder the policys 
effectiveness in achieving its goals.  
Given the magnitude of this topic and of the existing literature and policy-research 
produced on it, it is not the purpose of this paper to address this issue in detail. Instead, 
the current section presents a summary review of the main tensions, allowing a more 
complete appraisal of strengths and weaknesses of the current Cohesion policy approach.  
As far as the countries covered by this review are concerned, the main tensions with regard 
to the internal coherence of Cohesion policy relate primarily to: (i) their territorial focus; 
(ii) the soundness of the strategies pursued; and, crucially, (iii) the rules governing 
management and control of programmes.  
6.1 Strategic focus 
In the so-called equity/efficiency debate,119 discussions of the new regional policy 
paradigm suggest that the pursuit of spatial equity (adequate levels of service provision and 
income in all regions) and economic efficiency (growth and competitiveness) are mutually 
reinforcing.120 The popularity of national growth/competitiveness approaches in domestic 
regional policy, and the increasing Lisbon orientation of both domestic and Cohesion policy 
programmes, imply widespread support for this school of thought. However, other analyses 
suggest that there is a trade-off between these two competing goals, and that this trade-
off is becoming increasingly topical in the framework of rising budgetary constraints.121  
The optimal balance between basic infrastructure development and more sophisticated 
efforts to boost the business environment in regions or between environmental protection 
and economic development is still debated. In some countries, there is still a perceived 
need for more traditional forms of regional development support than is allowed by a 
restricted Lisbon-focus. For example, although moving towards a pro-competitiveness 
agenda, Polish regional policy maintains some traditional concerns with struggling regional 
economies, and the government includes expenditure on transport infrastructure in its 
definition of pro-development initiatives. Accordingly, significant priority (and funding) is 
                                                 
119 OECD (2009) op. cit .; Begg, I. (2010) op. cit .; Fratesi, U. (2007) op. cit .; Bachtler, J. and Raines, 
P. (2002) A New Paradigm of Regional Policy? Reviewing Recent Trends in Europe, Report to the 
EoRPA European Regional Policy Research Consortium , University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.  
120 Bachtler, J. and Raines, P. (2002) op. cit .  
121 Fratesi, U. (2007) op. cit . 
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still attached to the development of basic infrastructure.122 Debates on the earmarking of 
Lisbon Strategy objectives have shown strong differences between national and 
regional/local elites on the structure of financial allocation, with regions and local 
authorities arguing that hard infrastructure, often of local character, is what is 
predominantly needed for successful development. Also in Ireland, Finland and Scotland 
(United Kingdom), there is a perception that some regions still need investment in basic 
infrastructure in order to boost competitiveness, such as the Border Midland and Western 
(BMW) region in Ireland and the Highlands and Islands region of Scotland.  
A second aspect of the equity-efficiency debate relates to concerns about funding take-up. 
In Ireland, for instance, there are concerns that the Lisbon orientation of Cohesion policy 
programmes may interfere with take-up in the BMW region.  A particular concern remains 
the potential of the region to absorb this type of funding, especially as much of the money 
the region receives will be front-loaded, and there is only one university in the region. The 
economic downturn, which has hit Ireland particularly hard, has made the situation even 
more difficult, as businesses have cut their R&D budgets and government has cut spending. 
Similar concerns are evident in Spain in relation to the Technology Fund NOP which is 
required to allocate 75 percent of funding to the Convergence regions. 
A further issue is that, due to the need for domestic co-financing, the Lisbon focus of 
Cohesion policy programmes ties up domestic resources. In the EU12123 and other large 
recipients of Convergence support, substantial amounts of EU funding against a background 
of constrained domestic public expenditure can limit the scope for autonomous domestic 
public investment priorities. In addition, because Cohesion policy funding must be co-
financed and spent within a certain timeframe, there is a danger that the content of 
domestic regional development activities may be dictated less by strategic considerations 
than by the need to absorb EU funds.124 
Lastly, the current focus of Cohesion policy on Lisbon goals (and proposed future alignment 
with the EU2020 strategy) and lack of area designation for non-Convergence regions may 
result in it being viewed as simply another source of economic development funding. This 
could represent a dilution of policy purpose in non-lagging regions, where Cohesion policy 
can easily become an additional funding stream for domestic regional strategies that would 
be implemented anyway, raising questions about the European added value of this policy. 
This leads to the issue of the territorial focus of programmes, discussed below. 
                                                 
122 Ibid., p. 20. The Polish press has noted some reservations among officials about the lack of 
emphasis on priorities such as infrastructure development that remain important themes for Polish 
regional development, see Nowa strategia Unii Europejskiej Gazeta Wyborcza 03.03.2010. 
123 In this case, the so-called Lisbon earmarking is voluntary, but a number of EU12 Member States, 
including Poland, have voluntarily aligned their Cohesion policy strategies with the Lisbon agenda. 
124 Thus some Polish academics, for example, differentiate between technical absorption (ability to 
spent funds on time and in line with procedures) but also to structural absorption (ability to use funds 
in a strategic, development-oriented way); Hausner, J. (2007) Czy naleĳy pomagaĄ regionom sãabo 
rozwiniētym?,  Sympozium Regional St udies Associat ion – Pol ish sect ion, Warsaw, 18.04.2007. 
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6.2 Territorial focus 
A second group of possible tensions or contradictions intrinsic to Cohesion policy relates to 
the territorial focus of the policy. With regard to those countries eligible predominantly or 
wholly within the Convergence Objective, and particularly in the CEE Member States, a 
controversial issue is whether policy should focus on national convergence with the rest of 
the EU, and thus predominantly on the capital regions, to the detriment of more balanced 
intra-state development. Theories of spillovers from capital regions to other regions are 
being called into question by growing internal disparities in many EU Member States (e.g. 
the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland from the EU10, but also 
Greece, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom from the EU15).125 This raises questions 
about how Cohesion policy investments (as well as sectoral policies) should be spatially 
targeted to help achieve intra-state GDP convergence. In Poland, in particular, the flow of 
investment to important metropolitan drivers or lagging areas has led to concerns in the 
current programme period about the marginalisation of poorly developed areas. This has 
resulted in the development of a model for allocating Cohesion policy funds that takes into 
account regional unemployment and levels of GDP. There is also a dedicated programme 
with ring-fenced funds for Polands eastern regions. 
The appropriateness of the spatial focus of the policy has also emerged as an issue in the 
EU15 Member States, where the changing spatial focus outwith Convergence regions 
(specifically, the lack of spatial focus in RCE programmes) is contested, as funding in 
regions covered by these programmes may no longer be focused on structurally weak areas. 
Although RCE programmes sometimes earmark funding for certain areas, EU funding is also 
used to fund generic economic development, with resources allocated across a wide range 
of eligible interventions. The Lisbon orientation and earmarking requirement have 
increased the concentration of spending in RCE regions to fund investments in the 
economic engine areas of these regions. Some policymakers interviewed for this paper 
argued that the territorial approach of the policy should be enhanced in order to contribute 
to territorial cohesion, but that the current focus on the Lisbon strategy (and, in future, 
EU2020) makes this difficult.  
Further issues related to the current territorial approach are the artificial separation of 
rural and regional development (discussed in Section 2.6), and the reliance on NUTS II level 
data to make EU-level comparisons, which are not deemed suitable for correctly 
representing the problems of sparsely populated regions. For this reason, Finland has been 
promoting the use of lower-level regional criteria (NUTS III) for these purposes, since this 
would convey a better picture of distinctive regional differences and opportunities. This is 
viewed as particularly important for understanding and responding to demographic 
challenges, which appear very differently depending on which level of data is used.126  
                                                 
125 OECD (2009) op. cit .  
126 Ministry of Employment and the Economy (2010) Suomen aluekehit t ämisst rat egia 2020, 17 March. 
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6.3 Administrative efficiency 
The administ rat ive burden involved in implementing Cohesion policy programmes has been 
much discussed, particularly in the context of the simplification debate. The Commissions 
summary of Member States 2009 strategic reports highlights the main challenges and 
systemic obstacles that have been identified.127 Despite the programmes being delivered 
in very different contexts, there appears to be some agreement that the key issues are: (i) 
the changes in the rules on financial control, which are perceived to be the most frequent 
contributor to implementation delays as Member States adjust to the new control system; 
and (ii) the complexity of managing overlapping programme periods.  
These issues highlight the perception that the heavy administrative burden associated with 
implementing the Funds has a cost attached, and that the cost may be at the expense of 
the pursuit of policy goals. Picking up on the themes highlighted above, research reveals 
widespread concern that the current focus on detailed administration and financial control 
leaves no space for reflection or reform, and it is, in the case of smaller programmes, 
disproportionate to the value of the programmes.128 Implementation systems for EU 
Cohesion policy are perceived as bureaucratic and cumbersome, and this discourages 
participation by valuable beneficiaries, effectively excluding certain sectors or stakeholders 
from the programmes (for instance, the voluntary sector in RCE programmes). 
This can also leave programmes struggling to commit resources and potentially displace 
activity towards domestic funding schemes, which are perceived as more flexible and user-
friendly. The focus of activity under the Cohesion policy programmes then becomes 
detailed administration and financial control, rather than project results and impacts. The 
n+2 rule comes in for particular criticism, as it is perceived to encourage a focus on 
maximising spend, rather than developing quality; it can lead to the selection of projects 
that are more administratively and technically mature, at the expense of others that may 
be closer to programme objectives;129 and it has led some programmes to relax project 
selection criteria to include less strategic (but financially viable) projects.130 Public 
administration literature has noted that over-emphasising one type of accountability over 
another  in this case, financial accountability over outcome accountability - can lead to 
perverse effects - the n+2 rule is a fitting illustration of this point.131 Nevertheless, as the 
rule is also commonly praised for having induced increased financial rigour in the way funds 
are spent, it is supported in principle, but with calls for ways to render it more flexible, for 
                                                 
127 European Commission (2010) op. cit .   
128 For example, in Davies, S. et  al  (2008) op. cit ., and Mendez, C. and Kah, S. (2009) Programme 
Implementation in Times of Economic Crisis: Review of Programme Implementation Winter 2008-
Spring 2009, IQ-Net  Review Paper 24(1), EPRC, Glasgow.   
129 Bachtler, J. et  al  (2009) op. cit .  
130 Davies, S. and Polverari, L. (forthcoming) Financial Accountability and Cohesion Policy, Regional  
St udies; Davies, S. et  al  (2008) op. cit .  
131 Gregory, R. (2007) Accountability in Modern Government, in Peters, G. and Pierre, J. (eds.) 
(2007) The Handbook of  Publ ic Administ rat ion, Concise Paperback Edit ion, Sage, London, p. 340; 
Mulgan, R. (2003) Holding Power t o Account : Account abil i t y in Modern Democracies Palgrave 
MacMillan, New York, p. 164; Davies, S. and Polverari, L. (forthcoming) op. cit . 
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instance exempting particularly innovative, longer-term or complex and composite 
projects.   
Further specific criticisms with respect to management and administration procedures 
include the fact that the error rate set by the Commission undermines the potential of 
audit activities to become real learning tools; that the timing of closure audits does not 
support programme implementation, but can result in a distorted view of a programmes 
achievements;132 and that the artificial demarcation between funds (in particular ERDF and 
EAFRD) and the emphasis on differentiation leaves potential beneficiaries confused and is 
time-consuming for programme administrators. It also potentially creates gaps in support 
coverage in the attempts to ensure there are no overlaps.133  
                                                 
132 Davies, S. et  al  (2008) op. cit .  
133 Unpublished IQ-Net research (UK fieldwork, 2008 and 2009).  
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION 
This paper has addressed three main issues: first, the external coherence of Cohesion 
policy; second, the coordination initiatives and frameworks put in place in the countries 
reviewed to assist such coherence; and, lastly, the internal coherence of Cohesion policy. 
It has focussed on the EoRPA countries  Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom  plus Ireland and Spain.  
Investigating the external coherence of Cohesion policy has entailed exploring the 
interrelationships between Cohesion policy and domestic policy frameworks and 
institutional environments. This has included an assessment of the potential tensions that 
exist between Member States own policy and institutional contexts and the goals pursued 
through Cohesion policy.  Some of the tensions discussed are part of the wider relationship 
between territorial and sectoral policies; others are specific to the relationship between EU 
and domestic funding; still others relate to the domestic administrative frameworks in 
which the policies are delivered (institutional framework and administrative capacities).  
The examples proposed in the paper are for illustrative purposes only, and they are not 
intended to represent all possible tensions that may exist between Cohesion policy and the 
domestic policy and institutional frameworks of the countries reviewed. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that the external coherence of Cohesion policy has implications for achieving the 
goals of Cohesion policy, i.e. regional catching-up (in Convergence areas) and growth and 
employment (in all other European regions). In other words, Cohesion policy may be 
hindered from effective pursuit of its intended goals if there are contradictions between 
sectoral and territorial policies, as in the examples discussed in Section 2. The same applies 
if administrative and institutional systems are inadequate for effective implementation. 
The provisions of art. 175 of the EU Treaty, that EU Member States should coordinate their 
economic policies so as to attain the objectives of Cohesion policy, implies the need for 
increased cross-policy coordination, yet there is little evidence to suggest that 
considerations of external coherence are taken into account and monitored in the countries 
reviewed. Only in one country is there a tool for the ex post monitoring of the territorial 
distribution of expenditure, and the tensions that exist between Cohesion policy and 
domestic policies have not been extensively and comprehensively explored or taken into 
account at the stage of policy preparation.  
This leads to the second main theme discussed in the paper, the importance of 
coordination initiatives and frameworks to assist external coherence. The research has 
highlighted the measures used by Member States to coordinate different policies. These are 
both institutional and strategic and include both long-term arrangements and more 
recent measures. On the institutional side, the research has illustrated examples of 
coordination of different policies via: long-standing institutional arrangements and recent 
government reforms; the targeting of increased cross-sectoral integration at the regional 
level with a reorganisation of functions at this level; and the achievement of increased 
integration between domestic and EU co-funded regional policy through increased 
operational integration at the level of policy instruments. Among the strategic measures, 
the paper presented cases of: the coordination of domestic and EU co-funded regional 
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policies achieved at national level through the NSRF (for instance in Sweden and Italy); the 
integration of the regional dimension in sectoral policies through spatial planning (notably 
in Poland, Austria and Wales); and coordination of regional policy with wider economic 
development policies at the regional level (as in England, Italy, Finland and Sweden). 
However, the effectiveness of such measures warrants a more thorough assessment.  
The last theme explored by the paper is the ‘internal’ coherence of Cohesion policy, i.e. 
its internal functioning. This also presents challenges and contradictions that may 
unintentionally hinder the attainment of the goals of the policy. An extensive range of 
literature and policy research has already been produced on this topic; for this reason, the 
paper presents only a summary review of the most important of these tensions. They relate 
to the policys strategic and territorial focus and to the administration of the policy, 
perceived to be too burdensome and formalistic (and thus not in line with policymaker 
aspirations for an increased results-orientation) and also unbalanced towards financial 
accountability as opposed to final outcomes. Some suggestions to overcome these 
limitations were presented in the Barca Report,134 but there is not yet consensus on the 
reforms needed to strengthen internal coherence of Cohesion policy. 
These conclusions raise a number of questions for discussion during the EoRPA meeting. 
1. External policy coherence  
x To what extent does the paper identify the main issues for the EoRPA countries 
with respect to the degree of coherence that exists between Cohesion policy and 
the domestic policies of Member States, both for regional development and more 
widely?  
x Most Member States do not seem to have systems in place to monitor the flow of 
government expenditure to the regions. The sectoral mentality of national 
ministries and the involvement of sub-national governments in service delivery 
make this a particularly challenging task. Would developing such a system be seen 
as useful by EoRPA countries? If so, what reasons have prevented this? Where such 
a system is already in place, what are the main perceived benefits and lessons 
learnt?  
x Cross-policy coordination can go two ways: domestic sectoral policies can be 
bound to comply with the need to contribute to the goals of Cohesion policy or, 
conversely, Cohesion policy can be used to meet the spending priorities of 
domestic sectoral policies. The variety of interventions eligible for Cohesion 
policy provides considerable scope for this. The outcomes of adopting one or the 
other approach can be expected to be different, although the increasing 
alignment of both (domestic policies and Cohesion policy) to the Lisbon agenda 
should in principle reduce the divergence in the end result of these two 
                                                 
134 Barca, F. (2009) An agenda for a reformed Cohesion pol icy. A place-based approach t o meet ing 
European Union chal lenges and expect at ions, Independent report prepared at the request of Danuta 
Hübner, Commissioner for Regional Policy, April 2009. 
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approaches. To what extent does Cohesion policy dictate the agenda for domestic 
policies in the countries reviewed or, vice-versa, to what extent do the domestic 
policies of Member States inform the content of Cohesion policy programmes? 
Does the chosen approach support or hinder the achievement of the goals of 
Cohesion policy?      
x Related, to what extent is the additionality of Cohesion policy brought into 
question by the way domestic policies and Cohesion policy interrelate with each 
other (not least in the light of the recent economic crisis and the constraints that 
this has placed on domestic budgets)? Should the mechanism for the verification 
of additionality be rethought (or should additionality be re-evaluated as a 
principle)?  
2. External institutional coherence 
x Over recent years, there has been a trend of devolution of responsibilities for 
regional policy delivery (and also more generally) in a number of Member States. 
This has led to increased attention on the issue of multi-level governance and 
vertical coordination (also beyond the traditional federal countries). Cross-policy 
coordination has been much less debated. To what extent do EoRPA countries see 
the need to reinforce the coordination that exists between Cohesion policy and 
domestic policies? Are the measures that exist in some countries, including those 
recently introduced, proving successful?  Can any lessons be drawn from 
successful cases of cross-policy coordination? 
4. Internal coherence  
The main tensions with regard to the internal coherence of Cohesion policy outlined in the 
paper relate to three factors:  the appropriateness of the strategies pursued; their 
territorial focus; and the rules governing delivery. 
x From a strategic perspective, research from the European Commission has argued 
that for the purpose of catching-up and growth, the available EU and national 
funds for investments should be concentrated on a clearly-defined hierarchy of 
objectives. Attempts to pursue simultaneously a wide range of objectives are 
likely to dilute the potential impact of public support.135 In the light of this, has 
the focus on the Lisbon agenda (with its wide-ranging remit) strengthened or 
weakened the ability of Cohesion policy to achieve its intended goals?  
x From a territorial perspective, and with particular regard to countries with large 
portions of territory in Convergence areas, is this focus considered to have been 
conducive to the delivery of regional catching-up or is Cohesion policy losing sight 
of its main purpose?   
                                                 
135 European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (2000) European 
Economy. The EU Economy: 2000 Review, no. 70. 
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x What would be the two or three key reforms needed to strengthen the 
administrative efficiency of the policy? Should the rules of Cohesion policy be 
rendered more flexible in order to align more closely with domestic systems and 
practices? 
